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“Asked whether he was meeting public expectations
that he would help close the district’s racial achieve-
ment gap, [the superintendent] said school board
members had not told him it was a priority.”
—Schaarsmith 2004
very state legislature implements its constitu-
tional obligation to provide a free, public edu-
cation through what voters typically view as
purely local boards of education or municipal
councils that are similarly responsible for education.1
From constitutional and legal perspectives, however,
these local school boards are agents of their parent state
legislatures and are state, not local, officers.2 This agency 
relationship contrasts with other forms of local gover-
nance. For example, city council members are 
inherently local officers since they direct municipal 
corporations that serve, in the view of state law and the
courts, purely local interests. Because education is 
typically a constitutional obligation on a state legislature,3
school board directors elected or appointed under state
law are inherently state public officers. Although school
board members are thus considered representatives of
the state legislature, they are still accountable to the local
electorate since it is fundamental in the United States that
the imposition of local school taxes be effected directly or
indirectly by an elected, local representative body autho-
rized to levy such taxes and approve expenditures for hir-
ing teachers, textbook purchases, etc.
What these agents of state government accomplish in
educating our children has profound implications for
our nation’s economic future. It is axiomatic throughout
the world that the improvement in human capital
through more effective education is the central mecha-
nism to improve standards of living in an increasingly
international and competitive economy. That there is
widespread national concern that learning outcomes in
our public schools are below expectations of parents,
students, and state and national political and business
leaders is an understatement. While both candidates for
the presidency in 2004 promised to direct further fed-
eral attention and resources to K–12 education, we
know that, historically, the federal ability to improve the
productivity of public education has been limited by the
constitutional delegation to the states of authority over
matters relating to “the general welfare.”4
Beginning in the 1950s, the federal role in public edu-
cation expanded5 through programs of targeted grants
for special needs students and federal aid to serve popu-
lations of poor K–12 school children. Such federal aid,
however, is only a small proportion of total spending for
K–12 public education—still less than 8 percent. 
The most recent federal legislation, the No Child Left
Behind Act (NCLB), obligates the states to heavily moni-
tor student achievement, with the objective that all stu-
dents perform to high standards by 2010. Schools that
fail to achieve this objective risk their districts being
required to offer alternative, choice-based schools for
students in underperforming schools.6States that do not
comply with various aspects of the NCLB may lose vari-
ous forms of flexibility accorded to a state by the U.S. sec-
retary of education as well as 25 percent of federal funds
granted to a state for administration. The presumption is
that withdrawal of funds will force the states to pay close
attention to what their agents achieve or fail to achieve in
terms of improved student learning outcomes.
Whether the threatened withdrawal of state flexibility
in the use of federal funds will realistically lead to
improved school performance over the next few years
remains an important and relatively underdiscussed
public policy issue. Even if federal monies were with-
drawn from the states, the impact in the aggregate
would be relatively minor since, as already noted, such
federal monies comprise no more than 8 percent of total
spending for K–12 public education. 
How local school boards and their school managers
respond to the incentives and penalties contained in the
federal law will ultimately determine how the latest fed-
eral initiative affects state educational policy. While there
are many appearances of increased federal and state
centralization of authority, some wonder if the lack of
federal financial control and the historical tension
between state education policymakers and local schools
may ultimately frustrate large-scale changes and desired
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improvements in student performance. Michael Kirst
recently observed,
While the scope of state activity is wide, however, the
effectiveness of state influence on local practice
often has been questioned. Some think it is quite
potent, while others see a “loose coupling” between
state policy and local schools that leads to symbolic
compliance at the local level. Still others believe that
worries about federal dominance of education are
greatly exaggerated precisely because NCLB is
unlikely to be implemented as intended. (2004, 37)
This past July, the Government Accountability Office
issued an interim evaluation of the NCLB and noted that
only 28 states had their plans fully approved by the U.S.
Department of Education and fully in place, while the
remainder were still working out details and negotiating
with the department (GAO 2004).
Our purpose is to examine comparatively the respon-
sibilities of local school boards who are the predicate
actors in the evolving drama surrounding the NCLB 
legislation. Our presumption is that because relatively
little federal money is involved, it is very unlikely that
improved learning, especially for the disadvantaged, will
occur because most urban school districts simply do not
face effective incentives to improve student learning,
and have historically found grave difficulties in imple-
menting changes. The question this paper addresses
involves whether or not there are other, more expedient
ways to effect improved learning outcomes through
changes in the organization of local school governance
that would move school governance mechanisms closer
to those found governing widely held, publicly traded
corporations. 
To begin to address this question, the paper builds on
an earlier comparative legal analysis of state ethics laws
that apply to local boards of education (Kolb and
Strauss 1999). The comparative analysis here is refo-
cused by comparing the structure of duties and author-
ity accorded to local school boards to the duties and
authorities accorded to directors of publicly traded, for-
profit corporations. 
The comparative analysis reaches the fundamental
conclusion that local boards of education have a great
deal of discretion in allocating resources and supervising
their management, but a very weak set of duties or
responsibilities, especially in relation to student learning
outcomes. The paper then identifies limited but mean-
ingful changes to existing mechanisms contained in
state school laws that will plausibly improve student
learning without additional expense.7
The suggested changes are consistent with state 
constitutional principles of state and local control over
public education, and are consistent with existing 
collective bargaining agreements and the role of heavily
unionized teacher corps in the major unionized states.
The changes are also consistent with a continued public
education monopoly over fulfillment of state constitu-
tional requirements that legislatures provide free educa-
tional services that are “thorough and efficient” to
school-age children. That is, expected improved out-
comes are not wholly dependent on an initial or wide-
spread introduction of charter schools or school vouch-
ers, as suggested by many economists; rather, they are a
series of changes that most would characterize as
strengthening purposeful local control of public educa-
tion can significantly improve educational outcomes by
more closely defining the duties of local school boards
and thereby creating liabilities for failures to perform
such duties. The presumption, then, is that local school
boards will begin to behave more consistently and act in
the interests of their stakeholders, as their private-sector
counterparts do, when allocating school resources and
monitoring outcomes. 
Another way to characterize the central finding of this
paper is to simply assert that the failure of public schools
to perform has been and will be the result of failing to
obligate those in charge of local schools to perform.
Publicly traded corporations maximize profits for their
shareholders because the failure to do so creates liability
and financial risk for the board and officers of the corpo-
ration. There is currently no counterpart in the public
education realm.
The paper then addresses the design problem of 
creating a new system of duties and authority that may
reasonably lead to widely desired outcomes for public
education. The new mechanism begins with a more
meaningful oath of office, and the creation of correlative
incentives that will lead local boards of education to con-
duct their affairs solely in the interest of improving stu-
dent learning. Moreover, such changes are largely within
the reach of any local school board and with 
little delay. School boards may choose to implement the
suggested changes now rather than wait for their parent
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certain school ordinances that will, through strength-
ened and refocused obligations on the allocation of
school resources, improve student learning outcomes.
The suggested changes involve the establishment of
mechanisms that create ethical, fiduciary, and education-
al performance standards as integral parts of the local
control of education that currently do not exist. By impli-
cation, they create new liabilities for school board mem-
bers and senior education leaders. A corollary to the
adoption of these changes is the proper compensation
and indemnification of school board members and
senior education leaders in the same manner found in
the governance of for-profit organizations.
This is not a paper about how to mandate or further
regulate public education; rather, it is a paper about how
to more effectively organize the local incentive structure
to ensure that the distribution of learning outcomes
shifts positively for everybody. As the reader will discov-
er, this comparative analysis leads to some striking dif-
ferences, such that common sense requires adjustment
in the way interests are organized at the local level for
school board directors. The thesis of the paper is that
with a revised incentive structure, it is entirely reason-
able to expect improved learning outcomes. However,
systemic change through tweaks in state school
codes/laws is required to enable local school boards to
improve educational outcomes.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses
how publicly traded corporations are typically orga-
nized and typically governed under federal and state
law. Section 3 describes how public education typically
is effected through state law, and discusses the latitude
accorded to local boards of education. Section 4 com-
pares and discusses the two schemes—monitoring
devices and activities that are observable in the case of
school boards, and publicly traded private corpora-
tions—and describes remedy mechanisms that each
system of governance faces from stakeholders who are
dissatisfied with outcomes. Section 5 contains suggest-
ed solutions to findings of a determined lack of coher-
ent incentives facing local school board members.
Focusing and rationalizing the incentive structure facing
local school boards constitutes the strengthening of
local control that is the promise of this paper. Section 6
concludes.
SECTION 2: THE DUTIES AND AUTHORITIES
OF BOARDS AND OFFICERS OF WIDELY HELD,
PUBLICLY TRADED CORPORATIONS8
General
Corporations are instrumentalities of state law that
were created in the nineteenth century to enable the
assemblage of sufficient capital to create large, geo-
graphically dispersed infrastructures such as railroads,
integrated steel facilities, and telegraph systems. In
return for making a stock purchase, investors received
partial ownership of the corporation and the prospect of
dividends and capital gains on their investments, as well
as limited liability for the activities of the company (as
contrasted to investments through sole proprietorships
or partnerships). Additionally, investors enjoyed new
ease in purchasing and selling partial interests in the cor-
poration via the stock market.
Since the purpose of the corporate mechanism was to
intermediate between many investors and a single orga-
nization, mechanisms were designed to ensure that
shareholders’ interests were effected by the organization.
The basic system that has evolved provides for the super-
vision of the organization by directors who are elected by
the investors. State law typically requires annual share-
holder meetings. The elected directors typically serve
part time,9 are paid, meet quarterly, and are responsible
for hiring the full-time, day-to-day managers of the cor-
poration. Voting rights of investors are typically propor-
tional to the financial stakes or money that investors have
at risk in the corporation.10 State law, federal securities
law, and state and federal court decisions govern the rela-
tionships between investors, their elected directors, the
corporation composed of corporate managers and line
employees and who are employed by the corporation,
and customers of the corporation. The creation of a cor-
poration occurs within a state and under state incorpora-
tion law, and includes a corporate charter that provides
for corporate governance. 
When shareholders believe the corporate charter is
violated through decisions by the board of directors,
there is recourse in state courts. Federal supervision of
the conduct of corporations followed concerns over
undue concentration (antitrust law), protection of
shareholder interests from manipulation of stock prices
by large shareholders in national stock markets, and the
use of misleading or false information to prospective
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decision in other areas, for example, in the areas of 
contracts and commercial relations, product liability and
consumer protection, personnel and labor relations, tax-
ation, and the environment. Thus, management deci-
sions running afoul of these standards can give rise to
shareholder disputes about boards inadequately moni-
toring management decision making as well.
Since incorporation is an act specific to the state in
which incorporation occurs, there is some variation in
state laws governing corporations, case law, and,
accordingly, in corporate governance patterns11. As a
practical matter, however, most major U.S. and interna-
tional corporations have chosen to incorporate in
Delaware (for a variety of reasons), thus its laws and
case law are generally viewed as most informative when
describing corporate governance procedures. 
Textbook microeconomics presumes that the primary
motivating factor in business is profits. The courts have
repeatedly affirmed this presumption when shareholders
have questioned the conduct of management that strays
from this maximand. In 1919, Henry Ford sought to lower
the price of Ford automobiles to benefit society, and cut
his dividend to finance this. The Ford Motor Company
was by then a publicly traded corporation and subject to
state securities law. Dodge, a shareholder, disputed the
pecuniary wisdom of this act, and the court agreed and
ordered Ford to pay the full dividend.12
In exercising its combined authority, the corporate
board is expected to pursue the profits of the corporation
through the exercise of care and loyalty to the 
corporation. Moreover, a legal duty of care and of loyalty
backs these expectations. Failure to fulfill these duties
subjects the individual director and the board in its entire-
ty to personal liability, which liability insurance may not
protect against. When a board decision vis á vis a corpo-
rate officer or single board member is made that share-
holders take issue with, litigation will center around
whether or not the decision reflected honoring the duty
of care and/or duty of loyalty. If the issue between share-
holders and the board or corporate officer entails board
refusal to take corrective action against a corporate officer
or board member, then litigation will take the form of a
derivative law suit. Thus, the derivative lawsuit is the vehi-
cle by which individual shareholders can bring disputes
over the propriety of board inaction on behalf of the cor-
poration as a whole.
The Duty of Care and the Business 
Judgment Rule
The duty of care positively obligates a director to per-
form his duties with the diligence a reasonable person in
similar circumstances would so perform. These circum-
stances are expected to vary according to the context in
which the decision, action, or nonaction was taken.
Whether or not a decision falls within the duty-of-care
standard requires an initial analysis of the “business judg-
ment rule.” This rule, in turn, proves a safe haven from
liability and litigious second-guessing by interested third
parties over every board decision. The basic idea of the
business judgment rule is that a decision based on rea-
sonable information and with some rationality does not
create liability for a director even if the decision turns out
badly for the corporation and its shareholders. Under the
American Law Institute’s definition,
A director or officer who makes a business judgment
in good faith fulfills the duty of care if the director or
officer: 
(1) is not interested in the subject of the business
judgment;
(2) is informed with respect to the subject of the
business judgment to the extent the director or offi-
cer reasonably believes to be appropriate under the
circumstances; and
(3) rationally believes that the business judgment is
in the best interests of the corporation.” (American
Law Institute, Principles of Corporate Governance,
§4.01[c])
These conditions, in turn, imply (1) a duty to monitor,
(2) a duty of inquiry, (3) a duty to make prudent or rea-
sonable decisions on matters that the board is obliged or
chooses to act upon, and (4) a duty to employ a reason-
able process to make decisions.
Case law indicates that the courts look for a failure to
exercise due care as evidenced by boards failing to pru-
dently examine alternatives, and by failing to seek an
informed basis for action before making a decision. At
the risk of stating the obvious, a decision that cannot be
rationally explained is a decision that fails the rationality
standard under the business judgment rule. Decisions
that are reckless or improvident can fall outside the busi-
ness judgment rule. The determination of whether a
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not the directors have informed themselves of all mate-
rial information reasonably available to them. Eisenberg
(2000) suggests that the standard for determining
whether a board decision is an informed one is one of
gross negligence.
The Duty of Loyalty
The pledge that a director will fulfill the duty of loyalty,
that is, act solely in the interests of the shareholders in
supervising the conduct of the corporation, is violated
when the director engages in self-dealing transactions
that juxtapose the interests of the director against the
interests of the corporation. This fiduciary responsibility is
strongest for full-time employees in a position to exercise
corporate authority, that is, the officers of the corporation.
Self-dealing for a director occurs when a director’s per-
sonal financial interests conflict with the interests of the
corporation. Self-dealing problems can be avoided by dis-
closure of such conflict prior to the approval of a transac-
tion, and/or by having a majority of disinterested directors
or disinterested shareholders pre-approve the transaction
after the initial disclosure of a conflict. 
The duties of care and loyalty are not entirely separate,
and there is case law from Delaware that obligates direc-
tors to provide true information to shareholders for con-
sideration prior to important decisions. Thus, the duties
of care and loyalty imply a duty to disclose, and failure to
disclose fully can create liabilities for the directors.
Standards of Conduct vs. Standards of Review  
While the duty of care appears to impose stringent
requirements on directors and officers of a corporation,
the standards of review are less stringent than the stan-
dards of conduct on which they are based (Eisenberg
2000, 545). Eisenberg characterizes the business judg-
ment rule as consisting of four conditions: 
(1) The director must have made a decision. So, for
example, a director’s failure to make due inquiry, or
any other simple failure to take action (as opposed to
a deliberative decision not to act) does not qualify for
protection under the business judgment rule.
(2) The director must have informed himself with
respect to the business judgment to the extent he
reasonably believes appropriate under the circum-
stances—that is, he must have employed a reason-
able decision making process.
(3) The decision must have been made in good
faith—a condition that is not satisfied if, among other
things, the director knows that the decision violates
the law.
(4) The director may not have a financial interest in
the subject matter of the decision. For example, the
business judgment rule is inapplicable to a director’s
decision to approve the corporation’s purchase of his
own property.
If the previously mentioned four conditions of the
business judgment rule are satisfied, then the quality of
the decision that may be reviewed involves the limited
standard about whether or not the director acted in
good faith, or under the American Law Institute formu-
lation, whether the decision was rational or rationally
based. If, on the other hand, the four conditions of the
business judgment rule are not satisfied, then the stan-
dard for review is broader, and entails both rationality
and fairness. 
The market for directors and officers’ liability insur-
ance provides a buffer between them and investors, cus-
tomers, government, and other litigants, since such
insurance, when triggered, will pay for the costs of liti-
gation as well as settlements or judgments metered out
by the courts. The market for such insurance also pro-
vides an additional oversight mechanism beyond
investor oversight, since premium costs can be conse-
quential. Further, when insurance carriers view classes
of possible decisions and lines of business too risky to
insure, corporate directors and officers may find them-
selves facing enormous personal liabilities which may
deter risky decision making. 
SECTION 3: PUBLIC SCHOOL BOARDS AND
THE CONDUCT OF PUBLIC EDUCATION
General
State laws related to public education provide for the
establishment of school boards through the election or
appointment of school directors and the assignment of
certain duties. Beyond providing for the establishment
of the school boards and school districts they govern,
state school codes provide for significant state financial
support for the provision of school services and super-
vise the basic educational process via mandatory atten-
dance laws for the students, definitions of minimum cur-
ricula, competency standards for employment, tenure,
removal of teachers and administrators, and graduationRoger T. Severino and Robert P. Strauss 78
requirements. Because of significant state financial sup-
port to local school districts, budgeting, accounting, and
financial reporting standards and independent local
audit procedures are specified in state school codes, and
state audits of annually generated school financial state-
ments are routine. Because the subjects of public edu-
cation are largely minors, considerable attention in state
school codes is devoted to protecting the safety and
health of students while they are under the control 
and supervision of the public schools. Because the
employees of school districts are public employees,
employer–employee relations are governed by separate
state laws dealing with public employees on such mat-
ters as employment and termination procedures,
employee health and retirement benefits, and the right
to strike. 
Historically, local tax support of public education was
limited to only those with children in the public schools;
however, in the early twentieth century general tax sup-
port of public education became and remains the dom-
inant pattern. Since local tax support of public education
is on average no more than 49 percent of total local
school spending, school boards are typically dependent
on state legislatures to provide annual appropriations,
and in some states, both annual operating budgets and
periodic bonded indebtedness are subject to referenda. 
The issues of authorities and responsibilities of local
school boards are complicated by the fact that they are
in effect governed by multiple jurisdictions. That is, state
legislatures appoint state boards of education (or they
are elected), which are authorized to regulate public
education and local school boards and their school dis-
tricts; governors appoint secretaries of education (or
they are elected), each of whom can issue policy direc-
tives that also affect local school boards and their school
districts. In this complex policy environment, however,
several things do stand out. State law governs state-level
agencies and local school board organization and con-
duct to the extent that a state chooses to specify policy
in these areas. If the state law language, however, is
vague or contradictory, state and federal courts will tend
to avoid meddling over particular decisions or policies
unless state or federal laws or constitutional provisions
are being directly appealed to. Federal law and decisions
on matters of civil rights and federal funding for poor
and special children create jurisdictional “hooks” that
plaintiffs turn to. Nonetheless, absent clear violations of
state law or policy rules, local school boards are free to
interpret their authority with substantial latitude. To the
extent that state law is vague or there is no guidance, the
courts have generally allowed local boards to legislate
and make rules as they see fit. Areas such as the particu-
lars of school discipline, extracurricular activities, the
curricula per se, textbooks, the maximum number of
school contact days, and the maximum length of the
school day remain within the discretion of local boards
of education (Russo 2004). 
Duties facing local school board directors under state
school codes usually entail the basics of the mechanical
production of graduates; state law guides such matters
as mandatory attendance, minimum contact days per
year (typically 180), minimum classroom contact hours
per year (typically 900), transportation, minimum cur-
ricula by grade level, health and safety, the hiring, reten-
tion, and dismissal of teachers, and correlative matters
surrounding collective bargaining rights. Only recently
have issues of testing or assessment become matters of
state policy, and in most states this is largely due to the
aforementioned federal legislation of 2001.
Becoming a School Board Member
The overwhelming majority of local school board posi-
tions are filled through regular elections after a period of
a few years but may be staggered. Since school districts
typically have their own local taxing authority, school
board elections are consistent with principles of local con-
trol. However, the qualifications for being a school board
candidate are by and large identical to the qualifications
for any other state elected office. That is, candidates must
be residents of the jurisdiction where they seek office,
must have domiciled in the district for a statutory period
before the election, must be of age, and must be willing to
take an oath of office upon election. Such nominal
requirements suggest that the duty of vetting school
board candidates lies entirely with the electorate.
Interestingly, very few states have candidate conflict of
interest or financial interest disclosure requirements. 
A few states have additional requirements. Alabama,
for example, mandates that members of the city school
board “shall be chosen solely because of their character
and fitness.” 13Yet it is unclear as to what party is respon-
sible for qualifying candidates under these restrictions
or how the assessments are to be made. Possibly the
strongest and most effective candidate requirements are
found in Oklahoma, which flatly bars any candidate con-
victed of a felony or misdemeanor embezzlement.
Furthermore, no candidate in Oklahoma may be current-
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employed in the school district or board. Also, school
director candidates in Oklahoma must pledge in writing
to “complete at least twelve (12) hours of instruction on
education issues, including school finance, Oklahoma
education laws, and ethics, duties and responsibilities of
district board of education members” shortly after elec-
tion.14 Such detailed and stringent candidate qualifica-
tions are certainly more the exception than the rule. 
Oaths of Office 
School board oaths of offices are generally applied
through state constitutional provisions covering require-
ments for all state elected officials. Many oaths of office
are creatures of state code, while a small minority is pro-
vided for school district officials in particular. A common
thread among oaths of office is their generality. The typ-
ical oath consists of a vow to15
(1) Support the constitution of the United States 
(2) Support the constitution and laws of the officer’s
state
(3)  Discharge one’s duties
a. faithfully or with fidelity
b. to the best of one’s ability
c. honestly (some states)
d. impartially (some states)
Oaths of office are commonly perceived as perfunctory
and purely ministerial—more like a ceremony of initiation
than the undertaking of serious duties. The generality of
most oaths understandably gives rise to this impression.
Still, oaths do serious work, and are especially binding the
more specific they are. Courts and legislatures are cer-
tainly willing and able to hold state officers to their vows
through the initiation and ratification of articles of
impeachment.16
The obligation to support the constitutions of the
United States and one’s home state extends to recogniz-
ing the jurisdiction of the courts and the laws of the land.
It is difficult to interpret more restrictions much beyond
that without running into constitutional trouble.17
To  discharge one’s duty “faithfully” or with “fidelity”
can arguably bind school board members to always act
in the best interest of the school district in all their
actions and inactions. That is, they are bound to proac-
tively work to fulfill the school district’s mission.
However, courts are loath to interpret affirmative duties
when they are not made statutorily explicit. It is more
likely that faithfulness and fidelity merely requires a
school board member to refrain from egregious abuses
of power that harm the district, such as through embez-
zlement or other comparable acts. 
The requirement to act “to the best of one’s ability”
seems to impose a duty of diligence on school board
members, yet such clauses suffer from the fatal defect of
subjectivity. First, knowing human nature, rarely do peo-
ple put in their truly best efforts over a sustained period
of time, particularly in volunteer or low-pay positions, as
are typically found in school boards.18 Moreover, it
would be nearly impossible to make such a determina-
tion in particular cases, as only the person in question
truly knows whether they have acted anywhere near
their ability and capacity. A persistent drop in perfor-
mance may be explained away by an equivalent drop in
personal ability. In other words, “I’m doing the best I
can” will always be a ready and effective defense as such
subjective assessments are difficult to disprove.
An oath of honesty, found in a small number of states,
at first glance appears to be subsumed by the oath to
fidelity—after all, faithfulness and dishonesty seem
incompatible. However, some states have decided to
include both clauses in their oaths, thus suggesting a sig-
nificant distinction. Indeed, a basic canon of statutory
construction holds that, as far as possible, legislatures
draft statutes without redundancies so to avoid render-
ing similar sounding clauses meaningless. It would not
stretch the imagination to think of undesirable acts that
are prevented by one clause and not the other. For
example, absent a duty of honesty, a board member may
lie to the other board members to influence a board
decision if the lie is sincerely done “for the good of the
school district.”
An oath of impartiality (also found in a small number
of states) seems to target those acts that are inherently
biased. But what bias is covered? It is quite possible that
official actions motivated by nepotism would fall under
such a clause alone, but the fact that most of these states
felt required to prohibit nepotism explicitly in the school
code suggests otherwise. Financial conflicts of interest
may be covered, as that may be one of the few biases
stronger than family interests, but we speculate the
oaths may have been adopted to prevent invidious dis-
criminatory actions such as discrimination by race or
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Finally, to complicate matters, some oaths explicitly
require that officers agree to not have conflicts of inter-
est while serving in office. Such additional requirements
are relatively rare and when they do apply, and often
apply only to a subset of state officers.
To  summarize, most school board oaths are identical
to the oaths taken by all state officers and thus very gen-
eral. A minority of oaths are more restrictive regarding
honesty and deal directly or obliquely with conflicts of
interest. Of this minority, some consist of more restric-
tive state oaths that also apply to school boards; some
are school-board-specific oaths that are more restrictive
than their respective state oaths, while some other
school board oaths are actually less restrictive than the
general statewide oaths. These findings are compiled in
table 1.
The oaths of office listed in table 1 set forth the over-
arching parameters (or duties) governing how public
officials must discharge their specific duties of office.
Those specific duties are generally fleshed out in the
state ethics codes, election codes, and educational
codes in particular. As an illustration, Rhode Island man-
dates the following duties for school board members:
Rhode Island General Laws § 16-2-9.1
Code of basic management principles and ethical school
standards
(a)…The school committee accepts the obligation to
operate the public schools in accordance with the fun-
damental principles and standards of school manage-
ment, which principles include but are not limited to the
following:
(1) Formulate written policy for the administration of
schools to be reviewed regularly and revised as nec-
essary.
(2) Exercise legislative, policymaking, planning and
appraising functions and delegate administrative
functions in the operation of schools.
(3) Recognize their critical responsibility for selecting
the superintendent, defining his or her responsibili-
ties, and evaluating his or her performance regularly
without directly engaging in administrative processes.
(4) Accept and encourage a variety of opinions from
and communication with all parts of the community.
(5) Make public relevant institutional information in
order to promote communication and understanding
between the school system and the community.
(6) Act on legislative and policymaking matters only
after examining pertinent facts and considering the
superintendent’s recommendations.
(7) Conduct meetings with planned and published
agendas.
(8) Encourage and promote professional growth of
school staff so that quality of instruction and support
services may continually be improved.
(9) Establish and maintain procedural steps for
resolving complaints and criticisms of school affairs.
(10) Act only through public meetings since individual
board members have no authority to bind the board.
(11) Recognize that the first and greatest concern
must be the educational welfare of the students
attending the public schools.
(12) Work with other committee members to estab-
lish effective board policies and to delegate authority
for the administration of the schools to the superin-
tendent.
(13) Avoid being placed in a position of conflict of
interest, and refrain from using the committee posi-
tion for personal gain.
(14) Attend all regularly scheduled committee meet-
ings as possible, and become informed concerning
the issues to be considered at those meetings.
Other states specify the duty to purchase school
books, manage district budgeting, hire and fire teachers
and support staff, ensure the health and safety of stu-
dents, prevent racially/sexually discriminatory treatment
of students, report attendance records to state authori-
ties as well as many other duties. But interestingly, we
have found that no state requires school board mem-
bers to guarantee that the students under their care
leave the education system actually and demonstrably
educated. Rhode Island comes close by requiring that
school board members “recognize that the first and
greatest19 concern must be the educational welfare of
the students attending the public schools.” Yet, through
a closer reading, we see that the duty is largely illusory.
A duty to “recognize” entails no concrete action once
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TABLE 1: STATE OATHS OF OFFICE APPLICABLE TO SCHOOL BOARD MEMBERS
Perform
Requirement Support Support Perform Faithfully Avoid
of Oath of Federal State to Best of or with  Perform Perform Conflicts
Office Constitution Constitution Ability Fidelity Impartially Honestly of Interest
Alabama 1/ Yes Yes Yes Yes Silent Yes Silent
Alaska 2/++ Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Silent
Arizona 1/ Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Silent Silent
Arkansas 2/++ Yes Yes Silent Yes Silent Silent Yes;
in contracts
California 1/ Yes Yes Silent Yes Silent Silent Silent
Colorado 1/ Yes Yes Silent Yes Silent Silent Silent
Connecticut 1/ Silent Silent Yes Yes Silent Silent Silent
DC 1/ Yes Silent Silent Yes Silent Silent Silent





Florida 1/ Yes Yes Silent Silent Silent Silent Silent
Georgia 1/ Yes Yes Silent Silent Silent Silent Silent
Hawaii 1/ Yes Yes Yes Yes Silent Silent Silent
Idaho 1/ Yes Yes Yes Yes Silent Silent Silent
Illinois Yes Yes Yes Yes Silent Silent Silent
Indiana 2/ Yes Yes Silent Yes Silent Silent Silent
Iowa 2/ Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Silent Silent
Kansas 1/ Yes Yes Silent Yes Silent Silent Silent
Kentucky 2/++ Yes Yes Silent Yes Silent Silent Yes; 
must affirm in contracts
eligibility for office + hiring
Louisiana 1/ Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Silent Silent
Maine 1/ Likely No Yes Yes  Yes Silent Silent Silent
Maryland 1/ Yes Yes Yes & Yes Yes & Only for Only for
diligently without State judges &
prejudice Treasurer high 
officers
Massachusetts 1/ Silent Yes Silent Silent Silent Silent Silent
Michigan 1/ Yes Yes Yes Yes Silent Silent Silent
Minnesota 1/ Yes Yes Silent Yes Silent Silent Silent




Montana 1/ Yes Yes Silent Yes Silent Silent Silent
Constitution 
allows only one 
form of oathRoger T. Severino and Robert P. Strauss 82
TABLE 1: STATE OATHS OF OFFICE APPLICABLE TO SCHOOL BOARD MEMBERS (CONT.)
Perform
Requirement Support Support Perform Faithfully Avoid
of Oath of Federal State to Best of or with  Perform Perform Conflicts
Office Constitution Constitution Ability Fidelity Impartially Honestly of Interest
Nebraska 1/ Yes Yes Silent Yes Silent Silent Silent
for class V 
districts only
Nevada 1/ Yes Yes “Well” Yes Silent Silent Silent
New Hampshire 1/ Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Silent Silent 
New Jersey 2/++ Silent Silent Yes Yes Yes & justly Silent Silent




New York 1/ Yes Yes Yes Silent Silent Silent Silent
North Carolina 1/ Yes Yes Silent Yes Silent Silent Silent
North Dakota Yes Yes Yes Yes Silent Silent Silent
Ohio 2/ Yes Yes Silent Yes Silent Silent Silent 






Oregon 2/++ Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Silent Silent
Oaths adopted must, also




Pennsylvania Yes Yes Silent Yes Silent Silent Silent
Rhode Island 1/ Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Silent Silent
South Carolina Yes Yes Yes Silent Silent Silent Silent
Must affirm eligibility 
for office
Tennessee Silent Silent Silent Yes Silent Silent Silent
Total Yes 36 37 23 35 10 2 3
Total Silent 4 2 16 5 29 37 37
Percent Yes 36/41= 37/41= 23/41= 36/41= 10/41= 2/41= 3/41=
87.80% 90.20% 56.10% 87.80% 24.40% 4.90% 7.30%
* Denotes that the school board oath is less restrictive than the state’s general public officer oaths.
++ Denotes that the school board oath is more restrictive than the state’s general public officer oaths.
1/  Denotes that the school board oath is governed by or relies exclusively on a state’s general oath.
2/  Denotes that the oath applies specifically to school boards.
Source: Appendix 1 State and Federal Oaths of OfficeImproving Public Education Through Strengthened Local Control 83
in a variety of states. Given recent trends in the courts
of finding districts liable, risk-averse districts have
increasingly taken out liability insurance, even when the
act of obtaining such insurance may contradict school
code budgeting requirements. 
Beginning in the late 1950s, some state courts held
districts liable when students were injured while being
transported by school buses. Most states positively
obligate districts to follow elaborate, state-specified
building codes, and some state legislatures have statuto-
rily put school districts on the same basis as private cor-
porations and individuals for broad classes of health and
safety matters.22 It is settled law, however, that a legisla-
ture can prospectively reestablish nonliability in an area
that was affected by a court decision. 
School board members are usually not individually
liable for the exercise of judgment. However, individual
liability flows when the negligent act or failure to act was
corrupt or malicious, or when the act was outside the
scope of enumerated school board duties. School board
members face personal liability for duties that are explicit
and ministerial as contrasted with duties involving dis-
cretion. The issue with a board decision then typically
involves the liability of the entire board, and whether or
not sovereign immunity is applicable. 
School boards often are not themselves liable for
injuries to students that occur while the students are
under the supervision of employed personnel. Liability
may flow, however, to the individual teacher whose
actions were inconsistent with state or local policy. And
that liability may flow back to the district and board if
state law, conditions of an insurance policy or school
policy implementing state law requires the active super-
vision of the errant teacher.23
When an educator fails to act when there is a statutory
duty or regulatory obligation to act, liability may result
due to this nonfeasance. When an educator fails to act
properly, liability may result as a consequence of malfea-
sance. Liability may flow to the school board as well if the
board fails to monitor dangerous activities that teachers
must supervise (athletics are a common problem area),
and fail to proscribe rules and guidelines that show rea-
sonable care, then they too may be liable for damages
that parents may seek to recover.
and then ignore. This choice of loose words is likely not by
chance as Rhode Island chose to use much stronger (in
terms of binding) terms such as “attend,” “avoid,” “work,”
“act,” “encourage and promote,” “establish,” “formulate,”
“make,” “exercise,” and “conduct” to specify practically
every other duty in the code20
Sovereign Immunity and the Duty of Care and
the Standard of Care
Historically, government entities, including school dis-
tricts, were able to claim immunity from civil actions
against them for intentional and nonintentional acts
through the assertion of sovereign immunity. The 
theory of sovereign immunity derives from the notion
that governmental authority, because it derives from the
people, can do no (recoverable) wrong against the peo-
ple. Alternatively, it has been asserted that since 
a local board does not have the authority to commit a
tort so that, were it intentionally to do so, it would be
acting beyond its legal authority. The courts have been
unwilling to recognize the notion of “educational mal-
practice” (Russo (2004, chap. 4, 7), which has its coun-
terpart in civil negligence suits. Angry parents and 
disappointed students have not been able to effectively
argue that graduation without commensurate skills at
basic levels constituted professional negligence on the
part of teachers and administrators.21
That said, there are numerous exceptions to the safe
haven that school districts and their directors have from
civil suits that claim negligence. Activities that are classi-
fied as proprietary, or those actions that are other than
governmental or promoting the cause of education in
nature, create liability for a school district. Thus, were a
school district to lease a facility for an extracurricular
activity, and a student was injured at the activity, then the
district would be liable for injury claims. If, on the other
hand, the injury occurred at a school-owned facility that
was constructed and managed in accordance with state
guidelines, the district would not be liable for injury
claims. Those suffering personal injury due to a failure 
of a local board can circumvent the assertion of govern-
mental immunity by demonstrating that the district main-
tained or allowed a public nuisance to occur, although the
determination of whether or not a particular hazard was a
nuisance has been a difficult matter for the courts to rule
on. Whether or not the board’s act of obtaining liability
insurance eliminates the safe haven of governmental
immunity, which prevents a plaintiff from recovering
monetary damages from the district, has been an issueRoger T. Severino and Robert P. Strauss 84
Conflict of Interest
Representative democracy assumes that the policy
choices of elected representatives (and their motivations)
can, and sometimes should, diverge from their con-
stituents.24 However, the very possibility of diverging
motivations can lead to a host of undesirable conflicts of
interests and outcomes. Widespread corruption in all lev-
els of government sparked the Progressive Era efforts to
clean up decidedly unrepresentative politics nearly a
century ago (Levine 2000). The lessons learned from
that era have certainly influenced the many state codes
of ethics we have today such that state conflict of inter-
est prohibitions are found in elections codes, ethics
codes, government (public officer) codes, education
codes and even in constitutionally mandated oaths 
of office.25
Turning specifically to school boards, we note that
conflict-of-interest prohibitions vary widely by kind and
character, but some general patterns emerge. First, the
prohibited interests are usually categorized as either
personal, financial, and/or familial. Second, the prohibi-
tions are typically confined to certain contexts, usually
employment and contracting decisions. Finally, the pro-
hibition’s enforcement requires either disclosure,
abstention from voting, or resignation from office and
covers direct or indirect violations. We shall consider
each variation in turn.
Personal Interest Prohibitions
Some statutes regulate conflicts in very broad terms.
For example, Alabama prohibits a school board member
from using “his or her official position or office to obtain
personal gain” (Section 36-25-5). Similarly, the Delaware
Constitution obligates public officers “to place the pub-
lic interest above any special or personal interests.”26
These restrictions certainly cover the most egregious
conflicts—such as bribery in exchange for school board
action—but it is unclear how much farther they extend.
What if a school board member undertakes an action
that results in a personal benefit but was not a quid pro
quo? What if a school board member undertakes a con-
flicted action but sincerely believes he/she is still voting
in the best interests of the district?27 These general pro-
hibitions might prevent membership in potentially con-
flicting organizations such as teachers’ unions, book
publishers, and overlapping government offices. They
also could preclude board members from maintaining
their positions while suing their own board, although
this prohibition is often made explicit by statute.28
Precedent suggests this broad language may be very
powerful, but further research into court explications of
these general obligations is needed.29
Financial Interest Prohibitions
The most common and extensively regulated conflict of
interest centers squarely on money and its equivalents.
This comes as no surprise.30 Bribery, graft, embezzle-
ment, corruption, and self-dealing have accompanied the
institution of government from its inception.
Government agencies and programs are particularly
exposed to theft and abuse because, unlike in the market,
returns on investment are notoriously difficult to measure
and benchmark. The public school context compounds
the problem as it remains largely monopolized and tax
financed, thus at relatively greater risk to undetected
“leakage” than market-based counterparts.31
Legislatures have responded by erecting systematized
ethics rules and enforcement apparatuses, coupled with
criminal penalties, to ferret out abuses. Embezzlement
and bribery—conflicts of interest so obvious they are
usually considered just crimes in themselves—are
explicitly prohibited for virtually all state elected offices.
Softer official malfeasance such as “self-dealing” is often
added to the list of prohibited acts, but, it can be much
more difficult to spot as it has the air of complying with
the law. Montana’s public ethics statutes are good illus-
trations of the multifaceted nature of financial conflict of
interests and how they can be addressed. 
2-2-121. Rules of conduct for public officers and
public employees.
(1) Proof of commission of any act enumerated in
subsection (2) is proof that the actor has breached a
public duty. 
(2) A public officer or a public employee may not:
a. use public time, facilities, equipment, sup-
plies, personnel, or funds for the officer’s or
employee’s private business purposes; 
b. engage in a substantial financial transaction
for the officer’s or employee’s private business
purposes with a person whom the officer or
employee inspects or supervises in the course
of official duties; 
c. assist any person for a fee or other compen-
sation in obtaining a contract, claim, license, or
other economic benefit from the officer’s or
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d. assist any person for a contingent fee in
obtaining a contract, claim, license, or other
economic benefit from any agency; 
e. perform an official act directly and substan-
tially affecting to its economic benefit a business
or other undertaking in which the officer or
employee either has a substantial financial inter-
est or is engaged as counsel, consultant, repre-
sentative, or agent; or for evaluating proposals
or vendor responsibility, or renders legal advice
concerning the contract.
20-1-201. School officers not to act as agents.
The superintendent of public instruction or members
of his staff, county superintendent or members of his
staff, trustee, or district employee shall not act as an
agent or solicitor in the sale or supply of goods or ser-
vices to a district… Any such person violating this sec-
tion shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and, if
convicted by a court of competent jurisdiction, shall
be fined not less than $50 or more than $200 and
shall be liable to removal from his position.
Familial Interest (Nepotism) Prohibitions
Nepotism is defined as the “bestowal of patronage in
consideration of relationship, rather than of merit or of
legal claim.”32 It appears that nepotism is a recurring
threat to school boards, as it is often singled out and
banned in the school board context but not under the
states’ more generally applicable ethics guidelines.
School boards’ members (by law) work in the same dis-
trict they live in. Assuming there is some geographic sta-
bility to families, this fact alone will tend to concentrate
potential nepotism beneficiaries around a school board
member’s district. An election in the family of a school
board member has the potential of becoming a family
full employment act, depending on how one defines
family. Statutes vary their antinepotism language widely
so that some cover only spouses,33 others cover imme-
diate family,34 and some cover “any person related or
connected by consanguinity within the fourth degree or
by affinity within the second degree”35 or an equivalent.
Prohibitions on Interests in Contracts
When it comes to school boards, we have found the
most common conflict-of-interest prohibition deals with
interests in contracts. Indeed, in about 10 percent of the
states such prohibitions are written straight into the
oaths of office.36 This is an interesting fact because, as
mentioned earlier, financial interests are usually already
prohibited in other provisions in state law such as under
the state ethics or public officers code. Why the need for
overlapping provisions? Most likely, the states have
learned through hard experience that because school
board officials have broad contractual authority they are
relatively more likely to face these particular conflicts. 
For example, a school board member could, with little
trouble, steer a construction or accounting or textbook
contract to a business that he or she has an interest in,
opening the door to significant abuse. The added speci-
ficity removes any potential ambiguity and puts school
board members on notice.
Interest in Employment Prohibitions
The final category of prohibitions concerns the filling
or holding of government positions by a board member.
As illustrations, compare Kentucky, which commands
that a board member cannot “in any way influence the
hiring or appointment of district employees,”37 and New
Jersey, which mandates that no board member “shall []
hold office as mayor or as a member of the governing
body of a municipality.”38 As to the latter, the rationale is
easy to discern. School boards are designed to be health-
ily independent of the local executive and might be com-
promised by board members who wear dual hats. In the
words of the National School Boards Association, “in the
majority of districts, school boards have taxing authority.
That direct oversight—and responsibility—should not
be given to politicians whose first priority is something
other than education” (NSBA 2003).
As to the ban on influencing the employment deci-
sions of all other persons in the district, the danger is
more difficult to see. This might explain why few states
have as sweeping a prohibition as Kentucky. Still, one
can imagine situations where the persons in charge of
setting school policy and budget allocations should be
separated from the nitty-gritty of hiring decisions. In
other words, the separation limits the temptation of
patronage hiring by school board members. For exam-
ple, school board members in Kentucky are prevented
from “rewarding” a political supporter by hiring his son
as head custodian of a school. 
Scope of Enforcement
Many, but not all, state codes prevent conflict of inter-
ests when the interest is either “direct or indirect.” This
broad language is necessary to close an otherwise large
loophole. If a board member steers a contract to a com-
pany in which he is merely a stockholder, he or she
would indirectly benefit from a potential rise in stock
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the money would not go directly into the board mem-
ber’s pocket (at least not immediately), these conflicted
actions would be allowed, but for the ban on indirect
self-dealing. 
“Ban” may be too strong a word, as the states do not
enforce prohibitions on conflicts of interest equally.
While some states indeed disqualify conflicted members
from office, others are not nearly as strict.39 Some states
only prohibit voting or deliberating on issue while inter-
ested, while others merely require disclosure of interest
either before an election or to the board after an elec-
tion. Finally, some of the conflicts of interest mentioned
above are not regulated by school districts at all.
Immunity and Indemnification
Both corporate boards, through their charters and
state laws governing immunity, and school boards, under
the theory of sovereign immunity, seek to isolate or
exempt themselves from various kinds of liability. Federal
law and court decisions, however, in both examples can
override these safe havens if federal constitutional or
statutory assurances are breached because of the
supremacy clause in the U.S. Constitution (Russo 2004,
chap. 8). Similarly, state courts can encroach upon or
abrogate such immunities if state law is silent on a mat-
ter, or until state legislatures override a prior court deci-
sion reaching that result. 
Some state legislatures have enacted caps or limits on
set maximum amounts for recovery for various kinds of
claims as another way to limit the risk exposure to
school districts, and in reaction to the long-run trend in
the courts to limit immunity. 
School boards may also seek to lay blame on other
parties who contribute to the liability that may arise.
More recently, states have enabled school districts to
apportion negligence among parties so that each carries
a comparative burden of the liability. It is common now
for students and parents to sign consent forms that indi-
cate that they, rather than the school board and staff,
assume the risk of a particular activity.
Corporate boards are typically indemnified from the
costs of a wide variety of lawsuits, but there are limits.
For example, indemnification is generally not available
for fraudulent acts or in the derivative lawsuit context, 
as such protection from liability is deemed contrary to
public policy.
Compensation for School Directors
As a general proposition, school directors are reim-
bursed for out-of-pocket and travel expenses related to
attending board meetings; however, actual compensation
is typically quite modest. Of the 41 states reviewed above
vis á vis their oaths of office, only 23 allowed their school
board directors to take any direct compensation or salary
for their work. Given that school directors are state
agents, obligating them to impose local taxes to compen-
sate themselves for their time spent on behalf of the local
school district is curious. In Maryland, not only are the
specifics of oaths of office up to each local district, so too
are the compensation schemes. The largest salary we
were able to find was $2,000 per month. 
SECTION 4: COMPARISON OF GOVERNANCE
OBLIGATIONS FOR CORPORATE AND SCHOOL
BOARD DIRECTORS
Selection 
Our review of the structure of duties incumbent on
directors of publicly traded corporations and local
school boards brings to light a number of similarities as
well as a number of significant differences.
In both cases there is federal and state interest in the
financial oversight of these organizations, and mecha-
nisms have been devised to reflect immediate stake-
holders’ interests. Thus, both corporate directors and
school board directors are elected by their immediate
constituents: shareholders or residents of the school dis-
trict. Voting by shareholders is weighted by the extent of
their financial interest in the corporation while voting by
taxpayers follows the principal of “one man, one vote.”
However, besides the fact that shareholders interests are
weighted by their economic interests in the corporation,
and voters in a school district may or may not be directly
taxpayers,40 there is the initial disconnect that children,
who are the immediate subject of education and thereby
the immediate beneficiaries of education, are not able to
vote for school board directors until they reach age 18.
Reaching age 18 typically occurs during the senior year,
so the notion of accountability between the school board
and their immediate customers is remote. Further, those
who are of age and reside in the district, and thereby are
eligible to vote in local school board elections, may be far
less interested in the activities of the local school district
because they currently have no children in the public
schools or send their children to nonpublic schools.41Improving Public Education Through Strengthened Local Control 87
the corporate and school situations, the quality and
nature of information is quite disparate. 
Assertion and Acceptance of Responsibilities
Corporate responsibilities are positively asserted
through governance statutes that set standards of con-
duct and review, while school board responsibilities are
minimal, and particular topics that have arisen are dealt
with negatively through prohibitions. However, high
standards may be frustrated by the adverse self-selection
of candidates for school board office. Since these posi-
tions are largely unpaid, some school board members
may be tempted to seek monetary compensation in
other ways. In fact, in the corporate context, many of the
ethical duties of loyalty bind boards of directors precise-
ly because they are paid positions. According to stan-
dard corporate law interpretation, “corporate officers
and agents owe a fiduciary duty to the corporation. The
common law standard imposed involves a high degree
of honesty, good faith, and diligence because corporate
officers and agents render services for pay, and are
often full-time employees” (Hamilton 1996, 277–78;
emphasis added). It is harder to justify imposing these
high corporate obligations on public officers when they
remain uncompensated. In fact, the imposition of oblig-
ations and liabilities pose additional risks that would
normally demand additional compensation. After the
Smith v. Van Gorkom decision in Delaware (488 A. 2d
858 [1985]), which increased corporate liability by weak-
ening the business judgment rule, corporate directors
demanded a shield for their personal exposure. One
noted commentator recounted the wake of the decision
as follows:
Some outside directors began to reassess their deci-
sion to be directors, and isolated instances of resig-
nations were reported. The number of lawyers serving
on the board of directors of their clients declined. And
some people reported that it was becoming increas-
ingly difficult to persuade desirable persons to serve
on boards because of the potential risks involved,
despite the level of compensation and the availability
of indemnification and insurance. The response in
Delaware to the decision in Van Gorkom was prompt.
In 1986, § 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General
Corporation Law was amended to authorize corpora-
tions to amend their certificates of incorporation to
eliminate or limit the personal liability of directors for
monetary damages, with certain exceptions. These
exceptions are (i) for breach of directors’ duty of loy-
alty to the corporation, (ii) for acts or omissions “not
in good faith or which involve intentional misconduct
Another difference between the two forms of election
is their frequency. Corporate directors are typically
elected annually, whereas school board directors stand
for election for staggered terms that are usually four
years in duration. This means that accountability in the
case of school board directors is much more indirect,
and the opportunity to express ones support or lack of
policy through the ballot box is so infrequent to make 
it unlikely.
Perhaps more important than the nature of the elec-
toral differences is the difference in exit strategies avail-
able to unhappy stakeholders. A corporate investor who
is unhappy about the decisions made by the current
board of directors can immediately show his displea-
sure with the conduct of the corporation by selling his
shares in the corporation and investing in another
whose prospects are more appealing. Residents in a
school district who may be unhappy with the results of
the district’s educational policies vis á vis their children
do not have the same sort of immediate redress. As
every parent knows, finding a suitable alternative
school requires search, and uncertainty about whether
or not the next school will be truly better than the cur-
rent school. Further, the practicalities of changing resi-
dences may also militate against immediate or prompt
solutions to perceived educational shortcomings of the
current school.
What an investor knows about his corporation’s
progress in terms of quarterly earnings and dividends,
and what a resident knows about his school district’s
progress, are also very different. While both directors
must monitor and disclose systematic information about
the financial position of the organization, school board
members are not nearly as informed as their corporate
counterparts about the educational progress of their stu-
dents. Moreover, in most states, until very recently
school board directors were not required to monitor the
educational progress of their students. Even now under
the requirements of the NCLB, comparative information
about the progress of one’s own child in meeting vari-
ous goals is quite qualitative, and the standards of evalu-
ation are really not comparable from state to state. While
statistics on graduation rates and the percentage going
on to postsecondary education are collected and dis-
closed by state agencies, districts do not systematically
report on the type of education and employment that
their graduates attain so that an interested parent can,
on the basis of public information, make an informed
location decision. Thus, while monitoring occurs in bothRoger T. Severino and Robert P. Strauss 88
or knowing violation of law,” and, (iii) for any transac-
tion from which the director derived an improper per-
sonal benefit. Thousands of Delaware corporations
promptly amended their articles of incorporation to
take advantage of this new provision, which was
quickly adopted in many other states. (Hamilton 1996,
390–91)
A lack of compensation is likely already having a detri-
mental effect on local school board recruiting today. 
A survey conducted by the New York State School
Boards Association in 2001 found that almost one-third
of all school board candidates in New York ran unop-
posed. Similarly, the National School Boards Association
reports that,
School boards across the nation are finding fewer
people are interested in running for the board.
School board leaders attribute the dearth of candi-
dates to a variety of factors, ranging from increasing
demands on school boards to stronger accountability
measures for schools and students. Shrinking school
district budgets force board members to make
unpopular decisions about closing schools and cut-
ting staff. Some potential candidates are discouraged
by the extensive workload, which leaves less time for
family and other activities. (Chmelynski 2003)
Under these circumstances compensation seems to be
a reasonable predicate to the imposition of additional
duties.
Monitoring and Detection Devices in the Private
and Public Sectors
Both publicly traded corporations and public schools
are monitored by various external auditors to ensure that
directors and officials do not abuse their governance posi-
tions to the disadvantage of stakeholders, and to ensure
that the organizations, overall, are financially transparent.
However, whereas publicly traded corporations are 
subject to substantial federal oversight through federal
securities law, and the standardizing influences of a
national capital market, the preponderance of monitoring
and oversight for public school officials occurs in state
capitals, which necessarily implies greater heterogeneity
in oversight and subsequent conduct.
Under the duty of care, corporate boards are respon-
sible for maintaining systematic internal controls, and, to
remain within the safe harbor of the business judgment
rule, must reasonably inform themselves prior to mak-
ing board decisions. Personal liability for individual
board members usually involves questions about loyalty
and engaging in self-dealing. Typically articles of incor-
poration obligate an interested board member to active-
ly disclose to the entire board potential conflicts ahead
of time. Counterpart mechanisms for public school
board members involve financial disclosure while a
board member, and prohibitions against approving 
certain kinds of transactions as a board member that
might be self-interested. As noted, however, state laws
vary substantially in whether indirect self-dealing
through a relative, or on behalf of a relation, is effective-
ly precluded. This issue is especially evident during
board voting on personnel matters and teacher hires.
Even if an interested school board member abstains
from a vote on the decision to hire a relative, most state
statutes do not prevent quid pro quos from occurring.
When we compare the scope of self-dealing limitations
that govern school board directors vis á vis their private-
sector counterparts, we note that it is frequently far
more narrow. Recall that prohibitions may be limited to
contracts and personnel decisions, and may be silent
with respect to the sale and purchase of real property,
the issuance of debt, related legal and accounting fees,
and so forth.
External stakeholders in the private and public sectors
require and obtain reliable, independent audits of the
financial position of publicly traded corporations and
publicly supported school districts. In both cases, this
information provides valuable monitoring information
to respective private and public boards, and is used by
capital markets and state legislatures to serve their
respective interests to monitor the financial positions of
the organizations. For current and potential investors,
federal securities law requires the annual disclosure of
identically prepared and publicly reported financial
information in compliance with Regulation 10-K. This
public disclosure helps corporate directors maintain
their fiduciary relationship to the capital market. Overall,
school districts finance through taxes and fees 42.8 per-
cent of total K–12 spending. Federal aid totals 7.8 per-
cent and state aid 49.4 percent.42 Accordingly, the fed-
eral government, through the U.S. Department of
Education, promulgates standard financial classification
and accounting rules for public school districts. The
states obligate their delegated agents, local school
boards, to not only maintain their books and records in
accordance with federal and state strictures, but also
require local independent audits that are confirmed by
state audits as well. It should be emphasized that in both
cases, the monitoring and independent information
involves the financial position of the corporation or
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Moreover, if there is adequate disclosure or if a contract
is subject to an open public bidding process, interested
board members are in some states allowed to actually
vote on the contract. This latter practice differs from the
corporate norm where a majority of disinterested direc-
tors are required to approve transactions after a conflict
is disclosed. 
The scope of prohibited interests is further narrowed
in those states that do not cover both direct and indirect
interests. Whereas the duty of loyalty in the corporate
context has been interpreted broadly, states that do not
prohibit indirect interests open a wide door to abuse.
Creative accounting and the help of seemingly disinter-
ested accomplices can make many direct conflicts look
rather indirect indeed.
The mechanism for remedying violations is probably
the single largest area of difference between the corpo-
rate board and school board ethics regimes. Once an
undisclosed, executed, conflicted contract is discovered,
school districts often handle the matter through state
ethics commissions. Corporate malfeasance is typically
handled directly through the courts. Board members
may bring civil actions on behalf of the corporation
against conflicted board members in order to “unwind”
interested contracts. Similar unwinding is available in
the school board context, but is typically initiated
through ethics commissions and such claims may be
time barred44 or limited only to the profits or commis-
sions arising from the contract.45
But what if a school board or an ethics board fails to
pursue ethics complaints against a school board mem-
ber? In the corporate context, individual shareholders
may file derivative lawsuits, that is, suits on behalf of the
corporation in the face of board of directors’ inaction.46
Moreover, the costs of instigating such lawsuits are reim-
bursable by the corporation if the plaintiffs prevail. It is
unlikely that any comparable mechanism exists for ordi-
nary citizens desiring to hold school board members
accountable in the public school context.47
While school board ethics mechanisms may not be as
robust as the corporate board counterpart, the state
laws do have one clear advantage. Since state ethics
transgressions are usually categorized as misdemeanors,
fines and even short-term incarceration are punishment
options. This compares favorably to the corporate con-
text, where prison time is typically not available outside
of stock insider trading, embezzlement, and fraud.
Until the enactment of No Child Left Behind in January
2002, the federal government did not require each state,
as a condition of receiving federal aid, to assess students
in its public schools with federally approved standard-
ized tests. Section 1111 of the NCLB requires states,
through the required state plans, to devise a statewide
system of assessment that must be approved by the fed-
eral government prior to the state receiving federal
monies to implement the law. Even so, the required sys-
tem of assessments is phased in over a period of time.
Of course, measuring the academic progress of all chil-
dren in public education is in many respects more diffi-
cult than measuring the profitability of a publicly traded
corporation. While both activities are subject to system-
atic measurement, measuring profitability is a far less
controversial undertaking than measuring the learning
of children of different ages. This difference no doubt
reflects the lack of agreement on what constitutes ade-
quate yearly progress of students in reading, mathemat-
ics, and so forth. 
Sanctions for Conflicts of Interest
Regular elections are seen as the ultimate antidote for
unethical board members, both in the corporate and
public contexts, but this assumes every misbehaving
board member can be caught and thrown out of office.
Since unethical board members are quite easily able to
hide malfeasance for a time (and sometimes forever)
stronger deterrents are needed. Personal liability for
unethical board members, in some form or another, 
is required.
But, as we have seen, conflict-of-interest governance
differs greatly when comparing boards for publicly trad-
ed companies and boards for public school districts (as
well as differing greatly among school districts). Some
state school codes at first glance seem to exceed the
duty of loyalty in the corporate sector through bans on
conflicted persons from running for office or continuing
to hold office. However, these limits are typically narrow
and include exceptions. In any event, these somewhat
diluted “total” bans are only found in a few states. 
More commonly, school board members are typically
prohibited from voting on self-interested matters, which
appears to closely parallel the corporate duty of loyalty.
However, upon closer inspection, significant differences
do emerge and revolve around the issue of scope. To
begin with, school board prohibitions typically focus on
contracts and are not always exhaustive at that.43Roger T. Severino and Robert P. Strauss 90
Second, while corporate directors and managers are
obligated under the Ford decision to maximize share-
holder wealth, the primary objective of school directors
is vague. The terms “education” or “public education”
are typically not defined in state school codes.
Obligations of school directors are more often defined
in terms of prohibitions to avoid accusations of negli-
gence than in positive assertions of what they are sup-
posed to be paying attention to. In economic terminol-
ogy, school boards should be clearly obligated to maxi-
mize one outcome, just as their private-sector counter-
parts are. In our view, the primary focus of local educa-
tion should be improving the learning of each child in
relation to their capacity. “Learning” is more concrete
than “educating” and carries with it the common sense
notion of acquiring knowledge and skills that entail
• Study of English through spelling and the rules of
grammatical construction, writing, and the appre-
ciation of literature
• Study of American and world history, social stud-
ies, and civics
• Study of mathematics
• Study of science (botany, biology, chemistry, and
physics)
• Study of music and the arts.
Third, our review of states’ related statutes and prac-
tices with respect to the counterpart duties indicates
that they are scattered among various statutory provi-
sions—sometimes in state ethics codes, sometimes in
provisions affecting all government officials, and some-
times in school codes per se. We see merit in developing
not only a prototype oath of office that would parallel
the above-described duties of care, but also incorporate
a duty of loyalty and the corresponding business judg-
ment rules that would provide a safe haven for school
directors from frivolous petitions and litigation.
Fourth, we take it as a given that any oath of office
obligates school directors to positively affirm their sup-
port for the federal and state constitutions. Finally, we
also take as a given that school board directors should
be amply compensated for their time and affirmation
not to engage in self-dealing, and that there is merit in
their salaries being paid out of state monies in recogni-
tion of their agency relationship with their parent legis-
lature. Our suggested language in these areas follows.
Further research is needed to uncover just how often
prison time has been meted out in school board conflict-
of-interest cases, but we suspect such prosecutions are
rare. The single largest factor contributing to this result
is likely the strict requirement of mens rea, or criminal
intent. School board members must knowingly violate
the conflict-of-interest prohibitions before facing crimi-
nal sanctions, and ignorance of the law is for once a
good defense. A strengthening of oaths of office to
include a vow to avoid (or disclose) conflicts of interest
will serve to put board members on notice as to their
positive obligations and erase many ignorance defenses.
SECTION 5: IMPROVING PUBLIC SCHOOLS
THROUGH STRENGTHENED LOCAL CONTROL
General
School board directors’ responsibilities contrast stark-
ly with their publicly traded corporate counterparts.
While the former are typically obligated to merely
uphold the federal and state constitutions, the latter
must demonstrate a standard of care that depends on
principles of prudence and ordinary judgment. Even
though there is widespread concern about the state of
public education in our urban schools, national and
state pressures for improved performance remain, in
our judgment, essentially unheeded. What we observe
when we look closely at the obligations public school
board directors must honor is that they are vague and,
in many respects, unmeasurable. The question we
address here is what sort of modifications to the oaths of
office and ethical supervision that school board mem-
bers may be subjected to could materially change what
they do? Several immediate points are worth making.
First, if public policy were to impose new obligations
and liabilities on school board members, it is important
to accompany these new responsibilities with an incen-
tive structure that is self-reinforcing. As noted earlier, in
most states, school board members are essentially vol-
unteers who devote far more time than their corporate
counterparts on a monthly basis. Eisenberg estimates
that directors of large, publicly traded corporations
devote no more than 150 hours per year to their typi-
cally well-compensated jobs, while Hess48 reports that,
overall, public school board directors devote between
130 and 600 hours per year of their typically volunteer
time. Additionally, school districts should indemnify the
costs of successful litigation defenses and in limited 
circumstances may even cover losses, but not for any
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Consider how this oath might impact a budget decision
on, say, the choice between updating history books in the
middle schools in a district, compared to putting Astroturf
on the football field. Both would involve the allocation of
considerable resources, and under the suggested oath of
office the board would have to evaluate the purchase of
new textbooks and updating a football field against the
standard of improving student learning. It would seem
likely that the textbooks might be more favored under
this oath of office as contrasted with the sort of guidance
that boards currently face from their state board of edu-
cation. It seems far less likely that boards could conclude
that updating the football field would ensure students
would learn to their intellectual capacity, and would find
the argument for investing in modern textbooks to be
quite compelling vis á vis learning.
Note, too, that the proposed oath contemplates not
only the expenditure of resources, but the broader reg-
ulatory activities of education policy. Again, the oath
focuses the decisions to favor those policies that will
more likely ensure student learning. Thus, when choos-
ing a new textbook, both those recommending texts
(the educators) and those deciding which to adopt (the
board) will have to consider which texts will improve
student learning the most. In doing so they will have
access to the safe haven of the proposed school judg-
ment rule (see below), but only if they make the deci-
sion in a specific manner.
Finally, the proposed oath links substantive board
member obligations with both a duty of loyalty and a
duty of diligence and care. This objective duty of care
replaces the similar in intent, but practically ineffectual,
subjective “best of my ability” standard found in most
state oaths. One state, Maryland, already supplements its
subjective test with an objective one, and more will
hopefully follow.50 Likewise, a duty-of-loyalty standard in
oaths of office is not novel. Delaware’s constitution man-
dates that all public officers swear to “always to place the
public interest above any special or personal interests”
in discharging their duties. It appears that this constitu-
tional amendment of 1987 is a direct importation of
Delaware’s well-developed corporate governance stan-
dards. Our suggested amendments would merely apply
Delaware’s loyalty standard for public officers to school
boards in other states.51
A Suggested Board Director Oath of Office
The following oath emphasizes the idea that learning
is the primary objective of public education, and that
both board members and senior education leaders49
would affirm it:
“I [name], a duly elected or appointed school board
director or senior education leader, do solemnly
swear: 
To support the constitution of the United States and
to support the constitution and laws of this state,
To  allocate school resources and effect educational
policy solely for the purpose of ensuring that each
student learns to his or her intellectual capacity, and 
To discharge these duties loyally, honestly, impartially,
and with diligence and care, so help me God.”
This suggested oath of office achieves focus by requir-
ing that learning to capacity be the standard against
which board decisions should be evaluated. Note, too,
that the affirmation is for each student, and is not a
promise to be evaluated against a standard of average or
representative student learning vis á vis average or rep-
resentative capacity. The suggested standard also has an
implied egalitarian premise to it that might indirectly
impact current limitations on student participation in
various after school activities. Further, since board mem-
bers, superintendents, assistant superintendents, princi-
pals, and assistant principals would affirm the objective
of student learning as their purpose and point of focus,
any shirking that might have existed before would be
eliminated by the implied liability in taking this oath
of office.
This affirmation would significantly clarify many edu-
cational issues that now get muddied in discussions
about what constitutes a properly educated person. For
example, it is likely that participation in music of various
types (choral, instrumental) is not universal in most
school districts. Were a board to conclude that partici-
pating in learning about music is valuable, it would have
to at least offer, if not require, that such experiences be
available or required for each child. Otherwise, the oath
would not be fulfilled since it references each child as
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A Suggested School Board Director Affirmation
of Duty of Loyalty
As noted in the review of state ethics laws, state limita-
tions on conflicts of interest are an amalgam of direct lim-
itations, open procedures, and disclosure. The amend-
ments to the oaths of office outlined above must be sup-
plemented by clear statutory elaboration (and if need be,
court interpretation). Newly elected school board mem-
bers should, as much as possible know, what they are
binding themselves to. In 18 U.S.C. Sec. 201, a high fed-
eral standard defines what constitutes bribery, graft, and
conflict of interest for various federal officials, and would
appear to deter most, if not all, of the objectionable or
questionable school director conflicts. 
Consider the following reworking of 18 U.S.C. 201 as a
predicate statutory requirement for receiving state edu-
cation monies:
Any school board director or person selected to be a
public school board director who, directly or indirectly,
corruptly demands, seeks, receives, accepts, or agrees to
receive or accept anything of value personally or for any
other person or entity, in return for:
(a) being influenced in the performance of any 
official act;
(b) being influenced to commit or aid in committing,
or to collude in, or allow, any fraud, or make oppor-
tunity for the commission of any fraud on the 
state; or
(c) being induced to do or omit to do any act in vio-
lation of the official duty of such official or person;
Or whose deliberate actions place personal interests in
conflict with the director’s duty to the school district
and fails to fully and fairly disclose such conflict before a
public school board meeting;
Shall be fined under state law not more than three
times the monetary equivalent of the thing of value, or
imprisoned for not more than fifteen years, or both,
depending on the severity of the violation and may be
disqualified from holding any office of honor, trust, or
profit in the state.
The proposed duty of loyalty for school directors,
based on federal law and corporate governance princi-
ples, is far more inclusive than the state statutes we have
reviewed and includes both substantial monetary penal-
ties for its violation and holds forth the additional possi-
bility of substantial incarceration. Note that both direct
and indirect corruption of any sort is covered, and the
personal receipt of anything of value constitutes a viola-
tion of this duty of loyalty and is not limited, as we saw
earlier, to contracts or the hiring of school personnel. 
Liability insurance, if available, constitutes a buffer
solution (though imperfect) for corrupt board mem-
bers because the insurance companies have a signifi-
cant incentive to monitor and correct any situations
that pose undue financial risk to them. As stated earlier,
indemnification would not be available for knowing
breaches of the duty of loyalty.
A Business Judgment Rule for School Board
Directors
We next rework the American Law Institute business
judgment rule for our prototype governance environ-
ment for school directors. Recall that the intention of
fulfilling these conditions is to provide a safe haven 
for school directors from frivolous actions or litigation
by aggrieved parents and taxpayers in the district. 
We suggest:
A school director or senior education official who
makes a school judgment in good faith fulfills the
duty of care if the school director or senior education
official: 
(i) is not interested in the subject of the school
judgment;
(ii) is independently informed with respect to
the subject of the school judgment to the extent
the school director or senior education official
reasonably believes to be appropriate under the
circumstances; and
(iii) rationally believes that the school judgment
is in the best interests of the school district in
ensuring that each student learns to his or her
intellectual capacity.
These conditions, as in the case of the director of a
publicly traded corporation, then, imply (or could be
explicitly stated in an ordinance or state law):
a. a duty to monitor 
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place is the result of a disinterested party doing the eval-
uation of that learning. The teacher, because she is pre-
sumed to be initially responsible for the learning of stu-
dents, cannot be viewed as independent in informing
her supervisor that the learning in fact took place. Just
as quality control in the production of a wide range of
services entails a third-party examination of customer
satisfaction and comparison against a standard, inde-
pendent monitoring in schools would require a third-
party examination of whether learning to capacity was
actually taking place. This might be accomplished by the
school board creating their own independent learning-
audit capability, the development of external learning-
evaluation services, and/or the use of various kinds of
standardized learning-evaluation procedures. Having
teachers anonymously grade each other’s students’
work might be a simple way for school managers to
begin to obtain independent information about the
extent of learning; however, the standard of evaluation,
and ultimately the underlying curricula to be covered,
would become matters of discussion and policy.
Parental and Taxpayer Standing and Derivative
Lawsuits Against School Board Directors
When a student fails to learn to his or her capacity, the
question arises as to who is the aggrieved party, and
who has standing to argue that responsibility for this
shortfall lies with school board and senior education
officials. When there are positive acts that lead to such
learning shortfalls, for instance, the reliance on “whole
English” as a method of teaching spelling and writing
that many believe demonstrably leads to poor spelling
and writing skills, then the liability can become real
when monitoring demonstrates that the choice of using
“whole English” curricula is responsible for these poor
skills. However, there remain two thorny problems:
First, who in this new governance framework should
have standing to bring pressure on school board to cor-
rect its errant decision in a court of law? Second, what
recourse should there be for learning shortfalls that
reflect the failure to act? 
In the corporate arena, when a board of directors acts
contrary to shareholder interests and in violation of their
duties, the stakeholders are allowed to sue the board
derivatively in the name of the corporation (and be
reimbursed by the corporation for a winning effort).
Since the model oath of office ties school board duties
to the mandate of ensuring students learn to their intel-
lectual capacities, the stakeholders, that is, the persons
most likely to gain or lose from board actions, are the
c. a duty to make prudent or reasonable 
decisions on matters that the school board or
senior education official is obliged or chooses 
to act upon
d. a duty to employ a reasonable process to
make such decisions. 
Because both school board directors and senior
school managers are covered by this obligation, it fol-
lows that the superintendent quoted at the outset of this
paper, who defended himself in the face of very large
racial achievement gaps by arguing that his school board
had not made closing the racial achievement a priority,
would no longer have a place to hide. Similarly, any
school principal who, as a consequence of falling within
the definition of a senior education official, failed to be
informed of student learning shortfalls in her building,
would not be able to defend herself by being within the
school judgment rule, and thereby would face liability.
Further, as a consequence of the determination of such
large racial achievement gaps, there would be a breach
of the underlying oath of office that affirms that school
decisions are to be solely taken to ensure that each stu-
dent learns to his or her intellectual capacity, and the
prospect of liability for that breach would become quite
real and meaningful.
Good management entails constant monitoring and
the use of information to make decisions. The combined
effect of the proposed oath of office and the proposed
school judgment rule would be to obligate school level
managers to pay close attention to student progress, and
the activities of their teachers and related staff that impact
on such progress. The construction of this type of gover-
nance mechanism implicitly places responsibility on the
chain of management command between the superin-
tendent down to the school teacher for assuring student
progress on what happens with each student in the class-
room and the student’s teacher.
The qualification that the school director or senior
school official be independently informed deserves
comment and explanation. When a teacher engages in
grade inflation, that is, assigning high grades to all stu-
dents without regard to performance at a high standard
of demonstrated learning, the teacher’s supervisors
(principal, superintendent) will be unaware that actual
learning is not taking place. Similarly, remarks are in
order for social promotion. The notion of independent
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individual students. Thus, when school board members
act contrary to student learning interests and in violation
of their duties, the students should be allowed to sue
the board derivatively in the name of the school district,
and likewise be reimbursed for prevailing efforts. Of
course, as minors, the students’ interests would be best
protected and represented by their parents. In urban
districts, however, children are statistically more at risk
of not having natural parents but may have a guardian or
foster parent who is in charge of their well-being. This
suggests at a minimum that standing to bring action
against a school board be granted to not only natural par-
ents but to foster parents and guardians of each child.
There are other parties highly interested in the effi-
cacy of public education that merit consideration: tax-
payers and residents. Surely those who contribute to
defraying the costs of local public education have an
interest in the outcomes of such spending. Similarly,
those who reside in a district and are of voting age can
participate in the election of school board directors,
thereby creating a correlative interest in the decisions
and actions of school board members. However, there is
still a risk of waste and deadweight loss if school deriva-
tive lawsuits are abused. This risk exists despite the fact
that judges would summarily dismiss frivolous lawsuits,
the school judgment rule would protect diligent and
good faith school board decisions, and school districts
would be expected to indemnify board members that
prevail in court. Reasonably prudent school board mem-
bers should not be expected to constantly deal with law-
suits, otherwise there will be few qualified candidates
left applying for the job. This risk can be mitigated by
granting standing only to a limited set of stakeholders.
However, the risk of waste and annoyance must be bal-
anced against the salutary effects of widening the uni-
verse of standing, that is, against the benefits of having
more eyes holding school boards accountable in this
new system of governance. 
Some Implications of an Important School Board
Decision: Hiring Teachers
Several years ago, in conjunction with the reform 
of teacher certification requirements in Pennsylvania,
the second author of this paper undertook a major
empirical study of school board hiring practices for the
Pennsylvania State Board of Education52 and found that
half of Pennsylvania’s school districts did not have writ-
ten hiring policies, and that in an average district 
40 percent of the district’s teachers had attended that 
district’s high school. Moreover, various measures of
student achievement were inversely related to this mea-
sure of hiring insularity or possible nepotism.
Could a school board operating in this new gover-
nance environment openly or covertly engage in nepo-
tism vis á vis the hiring of a new teacher? We think not. 
The proposed duty of loyalty strictly prohibits deliber-
ate actions that place personal interests in conflict with
the director’s duty to the school district. Setting aside a
teaching job for a family member would obviously vio-
late the duty of loyalty as outlined above, as it would
place personal interests above student learning.
Moreover, this duty will be buttressed by oaths taken by
individual board members. 
Would the new governance environment obligate the
school board to hire the most academically qualified
teacher candidates? Were the oath of office to require
merely that students be educated to their intellectual
capacity, there might be some room for interpretation
on this issue, as education focuses on inputs. However,
moving from education to “learning” outcomes would
seem to more strongly imply that the teacher herself
must be learned in order to impart learning to her stu-
dents. Again, we suggest that the new governance envi-
ronment would move the school board to focus on what
teachers themselves know, once they become con-
vinced that what teachers know positively impacts stu-
dent learning outcomes. Certainly, the implied duty to
monitor that derives from the suggested school judg-
ment rule would encourage school boards to pay close
attention to the linkage between the school inputs they
control and student learning outcomes, which they
would now be responsible for. Educational researchers
likely would find greater interest in these matters than
has been the case historically.
Implementation Issues and the Matter of 
Dillon’s Law
While we believe we have provided a coherent argu-
ment for moving school governance much closer to the
model that applies to widely held, publicly traded cor-
porations, the idea may be so novel for those in public
education that objections related to their practicality,
feasibility, and undue risk may be expected to arise in
defense of the status quo. While the analogy we argue is
appealing, we can not demonstrate any firm empirical
evidence in support of a new model of governance that
conclusively demonstrates that student learning will
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oaths of office, there seems to be no impediment for dis-
tricts to implement the proposed amendments.55
It is our view that any politically independent local
school district could do likewise, since school districts,
as contrasted with a municipal corporation, are instru-
mentalities of state government, and far more like
home-rule communities than the form of government
that Judge John Dillon sought to regulate in Clark v. City
of Des Mones (1865).56 Recall that under Dillon’s rule,
municipal corporations may not exercise any power
unless expressly granted in words by the legislature.
However, as Richardson points out, only five states still
rigidly follow Dillon’s rule even for municipal corpora-
tions (Richardson 2000, 20). 
SECTION 6: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this paper was to compare and contrast
governance procedures in widely held, publicly traded
corporations and public school districts. Based on a close
reading of public oaths of office and ethics statutes in 
43 states and the typical provisions of corporation law, we
observe wide differences in the nature and detail of 
governance structures. While both organizations entail
elected directors, the duties and standards of evaluation
for directors of widely held, publicly traded corporations
are more extensive and transparent than those facing
elected or appointed school directors. 
To  recap a few findings from our extensive review of
state oaths governing school board directors’ conduct,
only 4.9 percent of the states positively obligate direc-
tors to perform honestly; about half require that board
directors perform to the best of their ability; only a quar-
ter require that school directors perform impartially;
and, remarkably, only 7.3 percent (three of 41 states)
require that school directors avoid conflicts of interest. 
We  think that obligating school officers to positively
affirm that they will allocate resources and effect policy
solely for the purpose of ensuring that each student
learns to his or her intellectual capacity directs attention
to what students, parents, and taxpayers expect from
public education in the twenty-first century.
While some may find this new set of responsibilities
possibly far too risky to undertake, we couple these sug-
gested obligations with an explicit safe haven from frivo-
lous litigation that flows from a positively stated school
director business judgment rule. This safe haven shields
highlight the ambiguous circumstances under which
school board directors currently govern. Several points
should be made to bulwark the adoption of such an
approach. First, we believe that the new governance
structure is far more transparent than the current situa-
tion in most states, and as transparency becomes appre-
ciated by school board members, it should actually
reduce risk and liability, and thereby insurance costs.
Second, even though our model is more severe in pro-
hibiting and sanctioning corrupt conduct, it is not that
much more demanding than current school law in pro-
viding school boards a safe haven. What is different,
however, is that under our model of school governance,
the safe haven occurs in diligently monitoring student
learning and requiring that decisions be informed and
reasonable. Further, the oath of office in effect states
that no child will be left behind as a matter of school
board policy. Moreover, the standard to be measured
against is what each student is capable of. 
We  thus find state enactment of this new model of
school governance to be meritorious and within the
purview of state authority in the area of public educa-
tion. It is possible, perhaps even likely, however, that
existing interest groups such as associations of superin-
tendents and principals and teachers unions will find
offense in the enactment statewide of these new obliga-
tions on school board directors. They would correctly
perceive that more focused and vigilant school boards
would more closely monitor their activities and insist on
changes in process and conduct that would ensure that
they could honor their oaths of office. Further, senior
education officials might balk at having to swear, along
with school board members, that they would act solely
to ensure that each student learns to his or her intellec-
tual capacity. Public discussion of such a perspective
would, in our view, be healthy, for it would identify cur-
rent impediments to improving student learning.
The question remains, however, whether or not any
school board, without state enabling legislation, could
obligate itself to follow this new form of governance.
There is already precedent in five states53 for making
local school board oaths of office stricter than those
applying to other public officers54 These states do not
seem, however, to require duties of loyalty and care as
precise as those suggested above. Thus, local districts in
states that wish to pursue our proposed governance
model would need to fully incorporate our suggested
standards in their oaths of office and ethics ordinances.
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all school directors that monitor and remain informed
and that exercise reasonable judgment. Additionally,
school districts would indemnify all school board mem-
bers that prevail in court. 
It is reasonable to expect that school boards that adopt
such governance procedures will not only pay more
attention to what their students accomplish by way of
learning, it will require superintendents and their man-
agers to pay more attention to what is going on in the
classroom. It will obligate them to be far more certain
that any direction or redirection of resources and school
policy actually improves student learning. For example,
this standard could readily lead to explicit discussions
about whether the prudent course of action is to raise all
teacher salaries or only those whose students are learn-
ing—particularly when collective bargaining agreements
are under negotiation. Moreover, the governance proce-
dures would likely encourage school principals to mon-
itor and intervene when some teachers’ students are sys-
tematically doing better or systematically doing worse in
terms of learning to their intellectual capacities.
While our first preference would be for states to enact
new oaths of office that reflect meaningful obligations
supplemented by a much more stringent duty of care
and loyalty ordinances than can be found in current
state law, we recognize that there may be substantial
political resistance to such innovations. Yet, such legisla-
tion seems well within the discretion that local school
boards currently have available to them, and we hope
that some will venture forth with this new governance
model and its higher standards. 
As these proposed amendments are adopted, changes
in student learning and school organization should
appreciably reflect the greater interest and focus on
learning outcomes that such rules will likely generate.
Where in the five states mentioned above that have
adopted more stringent oaths of office, there may
already be measurable results of such natural experi-
mentation to compile and compare. Certainly, the
impact of school governance on student learning is wor-
thy of further research. 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The authors wish to thank Mrs. Carrie Severino for her
assistance in reviewing state statutes governing, the
appointment, oaths of office, and ethics and budgeting
statutes that pertain to school board directors. The find-
ings and views of this paper are the sole responsibility of
the authors and do not reflect those of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Cleveland, the Becket Fund, Carnegie
Mellon University or its board of trustees.Improving Public Education Through Strengthened Local Control 97
1The Governments Division of the U.S. Bureau of the
Census (2002) identifies 13,726 school districts that are
created to provide public elementary, secondary, and/or
higher education and have sufficient administrative and
fiscal autonomy to qualify as independent governments,
and 1,508 municipal entities that provide these public
education services. Thirty-one states organize public
education through entirely independent school districts,
15 states contain both dependent and independent
school districts, and four other states and the District of
Columbia organize public education entirely on the
basis of political dependent systems. 
2This is settled nineteenth-century law (Russo 2004,
139).
3The usual constitutional requirement is for the legisla-
ture to provide for a “thorough and efficient” education
for the children of the state.
4Periodically, Congress has sought to expand the feder-
al role in local public education. However, as Kirst
(2004) points out, between 1862 and 1963 Congress
considered and rejected 36 times unrestricted federal
aid to school districts. 
5This was done first because of concerns over equality of
access to public education for students of color, and sub-
sequently for special needs students.
6See Section 1116()(1)(E)(i) of the No Child Left Behind
Act of 2001, Public Law 107-110 of the 102nd Congress,
signed by President Bush on January 8, 2002.
7The ideas presented below are a synthesis and amplifi-
cation of those found in Kolb and Strauss (1999) and
Strauss (1999).
8There is, of course, a wide variety of corporate forms.
However, for the purposes of drawing a comparison to a
public school district, the publicly traded corporation,
with a separate board of directors and separate manage-
ment, is the most reasonable point of comparison. 
9Eisenberg (2000) estimates that an external director
devotes 140 to 175 hours per year to his corporation. 
10That is, one share of stock entitles the owner to one
vote in the choice of directors and in the voting on major
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matters (mergers, acquisitions, divestitures, etc.) brought
to the attention of shareholders for determination.
11The American Law Institute and that American Bar
Association each has developed good practices recom-
mendations in the area of corporate governance. 
12170 N.W . 668 (Mich. 1919).
13Ala. Code 1975 § 16-11-2(c).  Qualifications for county
school board are even stricter on their face; “[Board
members] shall be persons of good moral character,
with at least a fair elementary education, of good stand-
ing in their respective communities and known for their
honesty, business ability, public spirit and interest in the
good of public.” Ala. Code 1975 § 16-8-1(b).  Again,
responsibility for enforcement of these provisions 
is unclear.
14Okl. Stat. 70 § 5-110(a).
15See appendix for the state-by-state oaths of office. 
16See e.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 21-4-3 (defining ground for
recall to include violating oaths of office); Fitzgerald v.
City of Maryland Heights, 796 S.W . 2d 52, 62 (Mo. App.
E.D. 1990). “Count 5 of the Bill of Impeachment charged
the Mayor with violating his oath of office…. The Mayor’s
oath of office required him to support ‘the provisions of
all laws of [Missouri] affecting Cities of the Third Class…’
We construe this oath as obligating the Mayor to enforce
state statutes in a reasonable manner.”
17See Baggett v. Bullitt, 84 S.Ct. 1316 (1964) (where an
oath requiring officeholders to swear they were not
“subversives” seeking to overthrow or alter America’s
constitutional form of government was found unconsti-
tutional).
18See § 3.4 infra.
19Oddly enough, this “first and greatest concern” is 
listed eleventh on the list of duties.
20The other instance of the word “recognize” under § 16-
2-9.1 is followed immediately by very specific “responsi-
bilit[ies].” Thus, § (a)(11)’s weakness stands alone.Roger T. Severino and Robert P. Strauss 98
21This immunity may explain why school boards have,
until recently, been indifferent to their success or failure
in improving student achievement. See Hess (2002) and
Wirt and Kirst (2001) on the recent emphasis that school
boards place on student achievement.
22However, no state to our knowledge has eliminated
governmental immunity in the area of student compe-
tency or student achievement. 
23It is common for state law to require that school
authorities have a “duty to supervise at all times the con-
duct of children on school grounds to enforce those
rules and regulations necessary to their protection”
(California). State laws typically also regulate the condi-
tions of school premises, and thereby establish liability
for those responsible for maintaining safe premises. 
24These antimajoritarian tendencies have lessened since
the founding but still exist in republican structures like
the Electoral College and the lifetime appointment of
Supreme Court justices, for example.
25See, for example, Maryland Constitution Article I § 9.
26Art. XIV §1.
27Interestingly, the oath of office conflict clause is less
restrictive for Delaware school board members than for
other public offices; it merely requires incoming mem-
bers to affirm that they did not buy their way into office
(Del. Code 14. I.10. III § 1053).
28One can scarcely imagine a more striking conflict of
interest than a board member voting to monetarily (or
otherwise) settle a legal dispute with himself or herself.
29To  begin the effort, a brief examination of New Jersey
case law on the issue of personal interests yields the fol-
lowing precedents: Rodecker v. Gonzalez, 93 N.J.A.R.2d
(EDU) 367 (1993), precluding a municipal counsel from
seeking election to school board of education due to
inherent conflict of interest; Board of Educ. of Tp. of
Howell v. Suchcicki, 93 N.J.A.R.2d (EDU) 157 (1992),
holding that union officials representing board of educa-
tion employees could not run for elected school board
positions due to conflict of interest; Board of Educ. of Tp.
of Jackson, Ocean County v. Acevedo, 92 N.J.A.R.2d
(EDU) 163 (1992), where conflict of interest forced a
board of education member to resign his seat after suing
the board for harming his son.
30”For the love of money is the root of all evils,” 1 Tim
6:10, New American Bible.
31That is, purely private schools are largely limited in
their ability to raise prices to cover losses from corrup-
tion (general cost cutting notwithstanding), while 
public schools have recourse to the incomparable
power of taxation. 
32Webster’s  Revised Unabridged Dictionary, 1998
MICRA, Inc.
33West Virginia Code, §6-10-1.
34Tennessee Code, 8-31-102, “Relative means a parent,
foster parent, parent-in-law, child, spouse, brother, fos-
ter brother, sister, foster sister, grandparent, grandchild,
son-in-law, brother-in-law, daughter-in-law, sister-in-law,
or other family member who resides in the same house-
hold.” But note how the “same household” require-
ment, which is fairly common, substantially weakens the
prohibition.
35Montana Statute 2-2-302.
36For example, Kentucky requires that “every person
elected to a board of education” shall swear “that he will
not, while serving as a member of such board, become
interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with or
claim against the board” (Kentucky Code, § 160.170).
Incidentally, “claim” in this context refers to lawsuits as
mentioned earlier.
37Kentucky Code, § 160.170, excepting the hiring of the
superintendent of schools or school board attorney.
38New Jersey Code, 18A:12-2.
39In fact, even the strict states are not nearly so rigid as
it may appear, as they often include a plethora of situa-
tional exceptions.
40Those enabled to vote in a school district are those
who are of age and residents of the school district. They
may or may not be taxpayers. Renters do not directly pay
school property taxes, but likely bear some of the inci-
dence of the school property tax through their rental
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41Even families with school-age children may not send
their children to public schools. Overall, nonpublic
school enrollment was 11.1 percent of K–12 enrollment,
and it is not uncommon for more than 20 percent of
school-age children in central cities to attend parochial
rather than public schools. 
42See www.census.gov/govs/www/school02.html.
43For example, Mississippi prohibits board members
from being interested in contracts for the “construction,
repair, or improvement of any school facility, the fur-
nishing of any supplies, materials, or other articles,
[and] the doing of any public work or the transportation
of children.” The statute is silent about contracts for real
estate, consulting, outsourced services, etc.
44Connecticut allows conflicted contracts to stand if
they are not challenged within 90 days of execution.
(Connecticut Code, Sec. 1-84[i]).
45Mississippi Code, § 25-4-105(6).
46However, dissenting shareholders must first inform
the board of directors of the complaint and give them an
opportunity to cure it before initiating a suit.
47In the federal context, private citizens have a right of
qui tam, which allows privately initiated lawsuits on
behalf of the United States for fraud by government 
contractors. Most importantly, prevailing plaintiffs are
entitled to a share of any money recovered. See Federal
Civil False Claims, Act 31 U.S.C., §§ 3729-33.  
48See Hess (2002), table 11. Fully one-quarter of school
board directors in large districts devoted more than 
70 hours per month or better than 840 hours per year,
or about 42 percent of a full-time job to school board
activities. 
49By “education leaders,” we mean superintendents
through principals and their assistant principals, that is,
all nonunionized personnel.
50In fact, Maryland’s constitution requires that its public
officers swear they will discharge their duties “diligently,”
the same term proposed in this paper. 
51Ironically, Delaware school boards members take a
separate oath that omits the duty of loyalty language
required of other public officers (See Delaware Code,
Title 14, § 1053 and Delaware Constitution, Article XIV).  
52For evidence that school districts do not hire the most
highly qualified teachers, see Ballou (1996), Ballou and
Podgursky (1995), and Ballou and Podgursky (1997). For
evidence that teacher quality impacts favorably on stu-
dent performance, see Boardman, Davis, and Sanday
(1977), Ehrenberg and Brewer (1994), Hanushek
(1970),  Ferguson (1991), Monk and King (1995), and
Strauss and Saywer (1986). For evidence that specific
teachers impact student achievement, see Rivkin,
Hanushek and Kain (2001). See Strauss et al. (1998) for
the study for the Pennsylvania State Board of Education
and Strauss et al. (2000).
53See table 1 and the appendix. 
54Interestingly, two states impose a less stringent oath
for school board members than for other public officers
generally (see table 1 and the appendix).
55Indeed, one state has oaths of office that already vary
across every single school district (see Oregon Statute
332.005 and the Oregon School Board Association
model oath office found in the appendix).
56See Reynolds (2000) for a discussion of Dillon’s rule in
relation to issues of sprawl in Virginia.Roger T. Severino and Robert P. Strauss 100
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APPENDIX 1 STATE AND FEDERAL OATHS OF OFFICE
ALABAMA
Article XVI of Alabama constitution provides:
“I, …, solemnly swear (or affirm, as the case may be)
that I will support the Constitution of the United States,
and the Constitution of the State of Alabama, so long as
I continue a citizen thereof; and that I will faithfully and
honestly discharge the duties of the office upon which
I am about to enter, to the best of my ability. So help me
God.”
ALASKA
Constitution Article 12 § 5. Oath of Office
All public officers, before entering upon the duties of
their offices, shall take and subscribe to the following
oath or affirmation: “I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that
I will support and defend the Constitution of the United
States and the Constitution of the State of Alaska, and
that I will faithfully discharge my duties as . . . to the best
of my ability.” The legislature may prescribe further
oaths or affirmations.
Sec. 14.12.090. Oath
School board members, before taking office, shall take
and sign the following oath or affirmation: “I do solemn-
ly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the
Constitution of the United States and the Constitution
of the State of Alaska and that I will honestly, faithfully,
and impartially discharge my duties as a school board
member to the best of my ability.”
ARIZONA
State of Arizona, County of _____________________
I, ____________________ (type or print name) do
solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support the
Constitution of the United States and the Constitution
and laws of the State of Arizona, that I will bear true faith
and allegiance to the same and defend them against all
enemies, foreign and domestic, and that I will faithfully
and impartially discharge the duties of the office of
__________________ (name of office)_____________
according to the best of my ability, so help me God (or
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ARKANSAS
Each director elected or appointed shall, within ten
(10) days after receiving notice of his election or
appointment, subscribe to the following oath:  
I,__________________, do hereby solemnly swear or
affirm, that I will support the Constitution of the United
States and the Constitution of the State of Arkansas, and
that I will not be interested, directly or indirectly, in any
contract made by the district of which I am a director,
except as permitted by state law and that I will faithfully
discharge the duties as school director in ____________
School District, No. ____________ of ____________
County, Arkansas, upon which I am about to enter.
CALIFORNIA
Constitution Article, XX Section 3
I, ______, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will sup-
port and defend the Constitution of the United States
and the Constitution of the State of California against all
enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith
and allegiance to the Constitution of the United States
and the Constitution of the State of California; that I take
this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or
purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully dis-
charge the duties upon which I am about to enter.
And I do further swear (or affirm) that I do not advo-
cate, nor am I a member of any party or organization,
political or otherwise, that now advocates the overthrow
of the Government of the United States or of the State
of California by force or violence or other unlawful
means; that within the five years immediately preceding
the taking of this oath (or affirmation) I have not been a
member of any party or organization, political or other-
wise, that advocated the overthrow of the Government
of the United States or of the State of California by force
or violence or other unlawful means except as follows: 
_______________________________________________
(If no affiliations, write in the words “No Exceptions”)
and that during such time as I hold the office of
________________________ I will not advocate nor
become a member of any party or organization, political
or otherwise, that advocates the overthrow of the
Government of the United States or of the State of
California by force or violence or other unlawful means.
COLORADO
22-31-125. Oath of School District Directors
Each director shall, no later than fifteen days following
the survey of votes, appear before some officer autho-
rized to administer oaths or before the president of the
board of education and take an oath that the director
will faithfully perform the duties of the office as required
by law and will support the constitution of the United
States, the constitution of the state of Colorado, and the
laws made pursuant thereto.
Constitution Article XII, Section 8
Oath of civil officers. Every civil officer, except mem-
bers of the general assembly and such inferior officers as
may be by law exempted, shall, before he enters upon
the duties of his office, take and subscribe an oath or
affirmation to support the constitution of the United
States and of the state of Colorado, and to faithfully per-
form the duties of the office upon which he shall be
about to enter.
CONNECTICUT
§ 1-25 for all other persons of whom an oath is
required
You solemnly swear or solemnly and sincerely affirm,
as the case may be, that you will faithfully discharge,
according to law, your duties as…to the best of your abil-
ities; so help you God or upon penalty of perjury.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
§ 1-501. Oath to be taken by officers
All civil officers in the District shall, before they act as
such, respectively take and subscribe an oath or affirma-
tion to support the Constitution of the United States,
and faithfully to discharge the duties of their respective
offices; and the oath or affirmation provided for by this
section shall be taken and subscribed, certified, and
recorded, in such manner and form as may be pre-
scribed by law.
DELAWARE
Delaware Code Annotated, Title 14. Education, §
1053 Oath of office of the school board member 
Each school board member shall, before entering
upon the duties of the office, take and subscribe to the
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I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support the
Constitution of the United States of America and the
Constitution of the State of Delaware, and that I will
faithfully discharge the duties of the office of school
board member according to the best of my ability; and I
do further solemnly swear (or affirm) that I have not
directly or indirectly paid, offered or promised to pay,
contributed, or offered to or promised to contribute,
any money or other valuable thing as consideration or
reward for the giving or withholding a vote at the elec-
tion at which I was elected to said office, so help me God
(or I so affirm).
Constitution ARTICLE XIV, Oath of Office, § l.
Form of oath for members of General Assembly
and public officers
Members of the General Assembly and all public offi-
cers executive and judicial, except such inferior officers
as shall be by law exempted, shall, before they enter
upon the duties of their respected offices, take and sub-
scribe the following oath or affirmation:
I, ____(name),______________ do proudly swear (or
affirm) to carry out the responsibilities of the office of
_________________(name of office) to the best of my
ability, freely acknowledging that the powers of this
office flow from the people I am privileged to represent.
I further swear (or affirm) always to place the public
interest above any special or personal interests, and to
respect the right of future generations to share the rich
historic and natural heritage of Delaware. In doing so I
will always uphold and defend the Constitutions of my
Country and my State, so help me God.
No other oath, declaration or test shall be required as
a qualification for any office of public trust. 
FLORIDA
Florida Statutes § 876.05  Public employees;
oath
(1)  All persons who now or hereafter are employed by
or who now or hereafter are on the payroll of the state, or
any of its departments and agencies, subdivisions, coun-
ties, cities, school boards and districts of the free public
school system of the state or counties, or institutions of
higher learning, and all candidates for public office, are
required to take an oath before any person duly autho-
rized to take acknowledgments of instruments for public
record in the state in the following form: 
I, _____, a citizen of the State of Florida and of the
United States of America, and being employed by or an
officer of _____ and a recipient of public funds as such
employee or officer, do hereby solemnly swear or affirm
that I will support the Constitution of the United States
and of the State of Florida. 
(2)  Said oath shall be filed with the records of the gov-
erning official or employing governmental agency prior
to the approval of any voucher for the payment of salary,
expenses, or other compensation. 
GEORGIA
Ga. Code Ann. § 45-3-1. Additional oath of public
officers
Every public officer shall:
(1) Take the oath of office;
(2) Take any oath prescribed by the Constitution of
Georgia;
(3) Swear that he or she is not the holder of any unac-
counted for public money due this state or any political
subdivision or authority thereof;
(4) Swear that he or she is not the holder of any office
of trust under the government of the United States, any
other state, or any foreign state which he or she is by the
laws of the State of Georgia prohibited from holding;
(5) Swear that he or she is otherwise qualified to hold
said office according to the Constitution and laws of
Georgia;
(6) Swear that he or she will support the Constitution
of the United States and of this state; and
(7) If elected by any circuit or district, swear that he or
she has been a resident thereof for the time required by
the Constitution and laws of this state.
HAWAII
Hawaii Revised Statutes § 12-7 Filing of oath
The name of no candidate for any office shall be print-
ed upon any official ballot, in any election, unless the
candidate shall have taken and subscribed to the follow-
ing written oath or affirmation, and filed the oath with
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The written oath or affirmation shall be in the follow-
ing form:
I, ____________, do solemnly swear and declare, on
oath that if elected to office I will support and defend
the Constitution and laws of the United States of
America, and the Constitution and laws of the State of
Hawaii, and will bear true faith and allegiance to the
same; that if elected I will faithfully discharge my duties
as __________ (name of office) to the best of my ability;
that I take this obligation freely, without any mental
reservation or purpose of evasion; So help me God.
IDAHO
59-401.  LOYALTY OATH—FORM
Before any officer elected or appointed to fill any office
created by the laws of the state of Idaho enters upon the
duties of his office, he must take and subscribe an oath,
to be known as the official oath, which is as follows:
I do solemnly swear (or affirm, as the case may be)
that I will support the Constitution of the United States,
and the Constitution of the State of Idaho, and that I will
faithfully discharge the duties of (insert office) according
to the best of my ability.
ILLINOIS
Constitution Article XIII, Section 3, Oath or
Affirmation of Office
Each prospective holder of a State office or other State
position created by this Constitution, before taking
office, shall take and subscribe to the following oath or
affirmation:
I do solemnly swear (affirm) that I will support the
Constitution of the United States, and the Constitution
of the State of Illinois, and that I will faithfully discharge
the duties of the office of... to the best of my ability.
INDIANA
Const. Art. 15, § 4 Oath or affirmation of office
Section 4. Every person elected or appointed to any
office under this Constitution, shall, before entering on
the duties thereof, take an oath or affirmation, to sup-
port the Constitution of this State, and of the United
States, and also an oath of office.
Indiana Code 20-5-3-1.5 Oath of members
Sec. 1.5. Governing Body; Oath of Office. Each person
elected or selected to be a member of a school corpora-
tion governing body shall take the following oath before
taking office:
I solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support the con-
stitution of the United States of America, the constitu-
tion of the state of Indiana, and the laws of the United
States and the state of Indiana. I will faithfully execute
the duties of my office as a member of this governing
body, so help me God.
Provided, that the school corporation governing body
may provide for such additional provisions to said oath as
the governing body may deem appropriate for said office.
IOWA
Constitution Article XI § 5: Oath of office
Every person elected or appointed to any office, shall,
before entering upon the duties thereof, take an oath or
affirmation to support the constitution of the United
States, and of this state, and also an oath of office.
Iowa Code § 63.10 elections
All other civil officers, elected by the people or appoint-
ed to any civil office, unless otherwise provided, shall take
and subscribe an oath substantially as follows:
I, __________ do solemnly swear that I will support the
Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of
the State of Iowa, and that I will faithfully and impartially,
to the best of my ability, discharge all the duties of the
office of __________ (naming it) in (naming the town-
ship, city, county, district, or state, as the case may be), as
now or hereafter required by law.
Iowa Code § 277.28  Oath required
Each director elected at a regular district or director
district election shall qualify by taking the oath of office
on or before the time set for the organization meeting of
the board and the election and qualification entered of
record by the secretary. The oath may be administered
by any qualified member of the board or the secretary 
of the board and may be taken in substantially the 
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Do you solemnly swear that you will support the
Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of
the state of Iowa and that you will faithfully and impar-
tially to the best of your ability discharge the duties of
the office of ___________ (naming the office) in
__________ (naming the district) as now or hereafter
required by law?
If the oath of office is taken elsewhere than in the pres-
ence of the board in session it may be administered by
any officer listed in sections 63A.1 and 63A.2 and shall be
subscribed to by the person taking it in substantially the
following form: 
I, __________, do solemnly swear that I will support
the Constitution of the United States and the
Constitution of the state of Iowa and that I will faithfully
and impartially to the best of my ability discharge the
duties of the office of __________ (naming the office) in
__________ (naming the district) as now or hereafter
required by law.
KANSAS
Constitution of the State of Kansas ARTICLE 15 §
14. Oaths of state officers
All state officers before entering upon their respective
duties shall take and subscribe an oath or affirmation to
support the constitution of the United States and the
constitution of this state, and faithfully to discharge the
duties of their respective offices.
KENTUCKY
Constitution Section 228, Oath of officers and
attorneys
Members of the General Assembly and all officers,
before they enter upon the execution of the duties of
their respective offices, and all members of the bar,
before they enter upon the practice of their profession,
shall take the following oath or affirmation: I do solemn-
ly swear (or affirm, as the case may be) that I will support
the Constitution of the United States and the
Constitution of this Commonwealth, and be faithful and
true to the Commonwealth of Kentucky so long as I con-
tinue a citizen thereof, and that I will faithfully execute,
to the best of my ability, the office of... according to law;
and I do further solemnly swear (or affirm) that since
the adoption of the present Constitution, I, being a citi-
zen of this State, have not fought a duel with deadly
weapons within this State nor out of it, nor have I sent
or accepted a challenge to fight a duel with deadly
weapons, nor have I acted as second in carrying a chal-
lenge, nor aided or assisted any person thus offending,
so help me God.
160.170 Oath of board members
Every person elected to a board of education shall,
before assuming the duties of his office, take the follow-
ing oath, in addition to the constitutional oath:
State of Kentucky, County of __________, __________,
being duly sworn, says that he is eligible under the law to
serve as a member of the board of education, and that he
will not, while serving as a member of such board,
become interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract
with or claim against the board, and that he will not in any
way influence the hiring or appointment of district
employees, except the hiring of the superintendent of
schools or school board attorney.
LOUISIANA
Constitution §30. Oath of Office
Section 30. Every official shall take the following oath
or affirmation: 
I, __________, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will
support the constitution and laws of the United States
and the constitution and laws of this state and that I will
faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the
duties incumbent upon me as __________, according to
the best of my ability and understanding, so help 
me God.
MAINE
Maine Revised Statutes Annotated, Subchapter
III. School Directors, § 1251. Board of directors
Provisions for a board of directors shall be as follows:
Oath of office. Before their first meeting, newly elect-
ed directors must take the following oath or affirmation
before a dedimus justice or notary public.
I__________ do swear that I will faithfully discharge to
the best of my abilities the duties encumbent on me as
a school director of School Administrative District No.
__________ according to the Constitution and laws of
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Maine Revised Statutes Annotated, Article IX.
General Provisions § 1. Oaths and subscriptions;
alternative affirmation; administration of oaths
to Governor, Senators, Representatives, and
other officers
Section 1. Every person elected or appointed to either
of the places or offices provided in this Constitution, and
every person elected, appointed, or commissioned to
any judicial, executive, military or other office under this
State, shall, before entering on the discharge of the
duties of that place or office, take and subscribe the fol-
lowing oath or affirmation: 
I, __________ do swear, that I will support the
Constitution of the United States and of this State, so long
as I shall continue a citizen thereof. So help me God.
I__________ do swear, that I will faithfully discharge,
to the best of my abilities, the duties incumbent on me
as __________ according to the Constitution and laws of
the State. So help me God.
Provided, that an affirmation in the above forms may be
substituted, when the person shall be conscientiously
scrupulous of taking and subscribing an oath.
MARYLAND
Constitution of Maryland Article I. Elective
Franchise, § 9. Oath or affirmation of office
Every person elected, or appointed, to any office of
profit or trust, under this Constitution, or under the
Laws, made pursuant thereto, shall, before he enters
upon the duties of such office, take and subscribe the
following oath, or affirmation: I, __________, do swear,
(or affirm, as the case may be,) that I will support the
Constitution of the United States; and that I will be faith-
ful and bear true allegiance to the State of Maryland, and
support the Constitution and Laws thereof; and that I
will, to the best of my skill and judgment, diligently and
faithfully, without partiality or prejudice, execute the
office of __________, according to the Constitution and
Laws of this State (and, if a Governor, Senator, Member
of the House of Delegates, or Judge), that I will not
directly or indirectly, receive the profits or any part of the
profits of any other office during the term of my acting
as __________.
Code of Maryland Title 5. State Treasurer 
§ 5-101.1. Oath
In addition to the oath specified in Article I, § 9 of the
Maryland Constitution, the Treasurer shall take an oath
to discharge the duties of the Office of Treasurer faith-
fully, diligently, and honestly.
MASSACHUSETTS
Constitution Art. VI. Oath and affirmation
ART. VI. Instead of the oath of allegiance prescribed by
the constitution, the following oath shall be taken and
subscribed by every person chosen or appointed to any
office, civil or military under the government of this
commonwealth, before he shall enter on the duties of
his office, to wit;
I, A.B., do solemnly swear, that I will bear true faith and
allegiance to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and
will support the constitution thereof. So help me GOD.
Provided, That when any person shall be of the
denomination called Quakers, and shall decline taking
said oath, he shall make his affirmation in the foregoing
form, omitting the word “swear” and inserting instead
thereof the word “affirm;” and omitting the words 
“So help me GOD,” and subjoining, instead thereof,
the words “This I do under the pains and penalties
of perjury.”
MICHIGAN
All officers, legislative, executive and judicial, before
entering upon the duties of their respective offices, shall
take and subscribe the following oath or affirmation: I
do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support the
Constitution of the United States and the constitution of
this state, and that I will faithfully discharge the duties of
the office of __________ according to the best of my
ability. No other oath, affirmation, or any religious test
shall be required as a qualification for any office or 
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MINNESOTA
Minnesota Statutes Annotated, Public Services
and Privileges, Chapter 358. Seals, Oaths,
Acknowledgments, 358.05. Oath of office
The oath of office to be taken by members and officers
of either branch of the legislature shall be that pre-
scribed by the Constitution of the state of Minnesota,
article IV , section 8. Every person elected or appointed
to any other public office, including every official com-
missioner, or member of any public board or body,
before transacting any of the business or exercising any
privilege of such office, shall take and subscribe the oath
defined in the Constitution of the state of Minnesota,
article V , section 6.
Constitution of the State of Minnesota, Article V.
Executive Department, § 6. Oath of office of state
officers
Each officer created by this article before entering
upon his duties shall take an oath or affirmation to 
support the constitution of the United States and of this
state and to discharge faithfully the duties of his office to
the best of his judgment and ability.
Constitution of 1857 as amended, Minnesota
Statutes Annotated State Employment Chapter
43. State Civil Service [Repealed], 43.16.
Repealed by Laws 1975, c. 399, § 2
The repealed section, which required officers, employ-
ees, and applicants for examinations to take an oath to
the effect that such person will protect and preserve the
property and money of the state, will uphold and defend
the state and federal constitutions, and except as 
provided in these constitutions not take part in move-
ments to alter or change our form of government, was
derived from: 
MISSISSIPPI
Constitution, Article 14, Section 268. 
All officers elected or appointed to any office in this
state, except judges and members of the legislature,
shall, before entering upon the discharge of the duties
thereof, take and subscribe the following oath: 
I, __________, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will
faithfully support the Constitution of the United States
and the Constitution of the State of Mississippi, and
obey the laws thereof, that I am not disqualified from
holding the office of __________; that I will faithfully dis-
charge the duties of the office upon which I am about to
enter. So help me God.
MONTANA
Section 3. Oath of office
Members of the legislature and all executive, minister-
ial and judicial officers, shall take and subscribe the fol-
lowing oath or affirmation, before they enter upon the
duties of their offices: “I do solemnly swear (or affirm)
that I will support, protect and defend the constitution
of the United States, and the constitution of the state of
Montana, and that I will discharge the duties of my office
with fidelity (so help me God).” No other oath, declara-
tion, or test shall be required as a qualification for any
office or public trust.
NEBRASKA
§ 79-552. Class V school district; board of educa-
tion; members; election by district; procedure;
oath; qualifications; student member
All persons elected as members of the board of edu-
cation shall take and subscribe to the usual oath of office
before the first Monday in January following their elec-
tion, and the student member shall take and subscribe
to the usual oath of office before the first Monday in
January following his or her designation.
§ 11-101.01. Oath of office; state and political
subdivisions; employees; form
All persons in Nebraska, with the exception of execu-
tive and judicial officers and members of the Legislature
who are required to take the oath prescribed by Article
XV , section 1, of the Constitution of Nebraska, who are
paid from public funds for their services, including
teachers and all other employees paid from public
school funds, shall be required to take and subscribe an
oath in writing, before a person authorized to adminis-
ter oaths in this state, and file same with the Department
of Administrative Services, or the county clerk of the
county where such services are performed, which oath
shall be as follows:
I, __________, do solemnly swear that I will support
and defend the Constitution of the United States and the
Constitution of the State of Nebraska, against all ene-
mies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and
allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely,
without any mental reservation or for purpose of eva-
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duties of the office of __________ according to law, and
to the best of my ability. And I do further swear that I do
not advocate, nor am I a member of any political party or
organization that advocates the overthrow of the gov-
ernment of the United States or of this state by force or
violence; and that during such time as I am in this posi-
tion I will not advocate nor become a member of any
political party or organization that advocates the over-
throw of the government of the United States or of this
state by force or violence. So help me God.
NEVADA
Constitution, Article 15, Section 2, Oath of office
Members of the legislature, and all officers, executive,
judicial and ministerial, shall, before they enter upon the
duties of their respective offices, take and subscribe to
the following oath:
I, __________, do solemly [solemnly] swear (or affirm)
that I will support, protect and defend the constitution
and government of the United States, and the constitu-
tion and government of the State of Nevada, against all
enemies, whether domestic or foreign, and that I will
bear true faith, allegiance and loyalty to the same, any
ordinance, resolution or law of any state notwithstand-
ing, and that I will well and faithfully perform all the
duties of the office of __________, on which I am about
to enter; (if an oath) so help me God; (if an affirmation)
under the pains and penalties of perjury.  
NEW HAMPSHIRE
Constitution Art. 84. Oath of Civil Officers
Any person chosen governor, councilor, senator, or
representative, military or civil officer, (town officers
excepted) accepting the trust, shall, before he proceeds
to execute the duties of his office, make and subscribe
the following declaration: 
I, A.B. do solemnly swear, that I will bear faith and true
allegiance to the United States of America and the state
of New Hampshire, and will support the constitution
thereof. So help me God.
I, A.B. do solemnly and sincerely swear and affirm that
I will faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all
duties incumbent on me as __________, according to
the best of my abilities, agreeably to the rules and regu-
lations of this constitution and laws of the state of New
Hampshire. So help me God.
NEW JERSEY
New Jersey Statutes Annotated, Title 18A.
Education, 18A:12-2.1. Qualifying oaths of 
members
Each member of a board of education shall, before
entering upon the duties of his office, take and sub-
scribe:
(1) An oath that he possesses the qualifications of
membership prescribed by law [see below], including a
specific declaration that he is not disqualified as a voter
[not on parole or a convicted felon] pursuant to R.S.
19:4-1, and that he will faithfully discharge the duties of
this office, and also
(2) The oath prescribed by R.S. 41:1-3 of the Revised
Statutes.
41:1-3. Oath of allegiance and oath of office; per-
sons required to take; form
Every person who shall be elected, or appointed to
any public office in this State or in any county, munici-
pality or special district other than a municipality there-
in, or in any department, board, commission, agency or
instrumentality of any thereof, and is required to take
and subscribe an oath of office shall, before he enters
upon the execution of his said office take and subscribe
the oath of allegiance set forth in R.S. 41:1-1 and, in addi-
tion, (a) any specially prescribed official oath, or (b) if no
text is specially prescribed for such oath of office, the fol-
lowing official oath of office:
I, __________, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will
faithfully, impartially and justly perform all the duties of
the office of __________ according to the best of my
ability. So help me God.
41:1-1. Oath of allegiance; form
Every person who is or shall be required by law to give
assurance of fidelity and attachment to the Government
of this State shall take the following oath of allegiance:
I, __________, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will
support the Constitution of the United States and the
Constitution of the State of New Jersey, and that I will
bear true faith and allegiance to the same and to the
Governments established in the United States and in
this State, under the authority of the people. So help 
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Qualifications, Title 18A. Education, 18A:12-2
Inconsistent interests or office prohibited
No member of any board of education shall be inter-
ested directly or indirectly in any contract with or claim
against the board, nor, in the case of local and regional
school districts, shall he hold office as mayor or as a
member of the governing body of a municipality, nor, in
the case of county special services school districts and
county vocational school districts, shall he hold office as
a member of the governing body of a county.
NEW MEXICO
§ 22-5-9.1.  Oath of office
All elected or appointed members of local school
boards shall take the oath of office prescribed by Article
20, Section 1 of the constitution of New Mexico.    
Constitution, Article XX, Section 1. 
[Oath of officer] 
Every person elected or appointed to any office shall,
before entering upon his duties, take and subscribe to an
oath or affirmation that he will support the constitution
of the United States and the constitution and laws of this
state, and that he will faithfully and impartially discharge
the duties of his office to the best of his ability.    
NEW YORK
Section I, Article XIII of the New York State
Constitution and provides, “I do solemnly swear (or
affirm) that I will support the constitution of  the United
States, and the constitution of the State of New York, and
that I will faithfully discharge the duties of the office of
_______, according to the best of my ability.”
NORTH CAROLINA
West’s North Carolina General Statutes
Annotated, Chapter 115C. Elementary 
and Secondary Education, Subchapter II.
Administrative Organization of State and 
Local Education Agencies, Article 5. Local
Boards of Education, § 115C-37. Election of
board members
Members to Qualify—Each county board of education
shall hold a meeting in December following the election.
At that meeting, newly elected members of the board of
education shall qualify by taking the oath of office pre-
scribed in Article VI, Sec. 7 of the Constitution.
West’s North Carolina General Statutes
Annotated, Constitution of North Carolina,Article
VI. Suffrage and Eligibility to Office, Sec. 7. Oath
Before entering upon the duties of an office, a person
elected or appointed to the office shall take and sub-
scribe the following oath:
I, __________, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will
support and maintain the Constitution and laws of the
United States, and the Constitution and laws of North
Carolina not inconsistent therewith, and that I will faith-
fully discharge the duties of my office as __________, so
help me God.
West’s North Carolina General Statutes
Annotated, Chapter 11. Oaths, Article 1. General
Provisions, § 11-7. Oath or affirmation to sup-
port Constitutions; all officers to take
Every member of the General Assembly and every per-
son elected or appointed to hold any office of trust or
profit in the State shall, before taking office or entering
upon the execution of the office, take and subscribe to
the following oath:
I, __________, do solemnly and sincerely swear that I
will support the Constitution of the United States; that I
will be faithful and bear true allegiance to the State of
North Carolina, and to the constitutional powers and
authorities which are or may be established for the gov-
ernment thereof; and that I will endeavor to support,
maintain and defend the Constitution of said State, not
inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States,
to the best of my knowledge and ability; so help me
God. (Amended by Laws 1985, c. 756, § 5.)
West’s North Carolina General Statutes
Annotated, Chapter 11. Oaths, Article 2. Forms
of Official and Other Oaths, § 11-11. Oaths of
sundry persons; forms
The oaths of office to be taken by the several persons
hereafter named [no reference to school boards] shall
be in the words following the names of said persons
respectively, after taking the separate oath required by
Article VI, Section 7 of the Constitution of North
Carolina:
General Oath
Any officer of the State or of any county or township,
the term of whose oath is not given above, shall take an
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I, A.B., do swear (or affirm) that I will well and truly
execute the duties of the office of __________ according




Members of the legislative assembly and judicial
department, except such inferior officers as may be by
law exempted shall, before they enter on the duties of
their respective offices, take and subscribe the following
oath or affirmation: “I do solemnly swear (or as the case
may be) that I will support the Constitution of the
United States and the Constitution of the State of North
Dakota; and that I will faithfully discharge the duties of
the office __________ according to the best of my abili-
ty, so help me God” (if an oath), (under pains and penal-
ties of perjury) if an affirmation, and no other oath, dec-
laration, or test shall be required as a qualification for
any office or public trust.
OHIO
§ 15.07 Oath of officers 
Every person chosen or appointed to any office under
this state, before entering upon the discharge of its
duties, shall take an oath or affirmation, to support the
Constitution of the United States, and of this state, and
also an oath of office. 
Ohio Revised Code § 3313.10. Oath of office of
member
Before entering upon the duties of his office each per-
son elected or appointed a member of a board of edu-
cation shall take an oath to support the Constitution of
the United States and the constitution of this state and
that he will perform faithfully the duties of his office.
Such oath may be administered by the treasurer or any
member of the board.  
OKLAHOMA
Section 5-116—Oath of Office
Each member of the board of education and the trea-
surer and assistant treasurer of a school district shall take
and subscribe to the following oath:
I__________  (Name of officer), hereby declare under
oath that I will faithfully perform the duties of
__________ (Name of position) of __________ (Name of
school district) to the best of my ability and that I will
faithfully discharge all of the duties pertaining to said
office and obey the Constitution and laws of the United
States and Oklahoma.
Oklahoma Constitution Art XV , § 1 Officers required to
take oath or affirmation 
All public officers, before entering upon the duties of
their offices, shall take and subscribe to the following
oath or affirmation: 
I, __________, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will
support, obey, and defend the Constitution of the
United States, and the Constitution of the State of
Oklahoma, and that I will not, knowingly, receive, direct-
ly or indirectly, any money or other valuable thing, for
the performance or nonperformance of any act or duty
pertaining to my office, other than the compensation
allowed by law; I further swear (or affirm) that I will faith-
fully discharge my duties as __________ to the best of
my ability.




Article XV Section 3. Oaths of office. Every person
elected or appointed to any office under this
Constitution, shall, before entering on the duties there-
of, take an oath or affirmation to support the
Constitution of the United States, and of this State, and
also an oath of office.
332.005 Directors as district school board; oath. 
(1) The directors of a school district in their official
capacity shall be known as the district school board.
(2) Directors must qualify by taking an oath of office
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Oregon School Board Association—Model Oath
of Office
I, __________, do solemnly swear that I will support
the Constitution of the United States, the Constitution
of the State of Oregon and the laws thereof, and the poli-
cies of the __________ School District. During my term,
I will faithfully and impartially discharge the responsibil-
ities of the office of School Board Member according to
the best of my ability. 
PENNSYLVANIA
I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support,
obey and defend the Constitution of the United States
and the Constitution of this Commonwealth, and that I
will discharge the duties of my office with fidelity.
RHODE ISLAND
R.I. Stat. § 36-1-2  Engagement of office
Every person, except the justices of the supreme and
superior courts, elected to office by the general assem-
bly, or by either house thereof, or under the provisions
of the law in relation to public schools, or appointed to
office, civil or military, by the governor, shall, before he
or she shall act therein, take the following engagement
before some person authorized to administer oaths,
namely: I, [naming the person], do solemnly swear (or
affirm) that I will faithfully and impartially discharge the
duties of the office of [naming the office] according to
the best of my abilities, and that I will support the
Constitution and laws of this state, and the Constitution
of the United States, so help me God: [Or: This affirma-
tion I make and give upon the peril of the penalty 
of perjury.] 
Constitution Article III, Section 3. Oath of gener-
al officers
All general officers shall take the following engage-
ment before they act in their respective offices, to wit:
You being by the free vote of the electors of this state of
Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, elected unto
the place of do solemnly swear (or, affirm) to be true
and faithful unto this state, and to support the
Constitution of this state and of the United States; that
you will faithfully and impartially discharge all the duties
of your aforesaid office to the best of your abilities,
according to law: So help you God. Or: This affirmation
you make and give upon the peril of the penalty of 
perjury.
SOUTH CAROLINA
I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I am duly quali-
fied, according to the Constitution of this State, to exer-
cise the duties of the office to which I have been elect-
ed, (or appointed), and that I will, to the best of my abil-
ity, discharge the duties thereof, and preserve, protect
and defend the Constitution of this State and of the
United States. So help me God.
SOUTH DAKOTA
TENNESSEE
8-18-111. Form of oath of office
The official oath, unless otherwise expressly pre-
scribed by law, shall be in the following form: “I do
solemnly swear that I will perform with fidelity the
duties of the office to which I have been appointed (or
elected, as the case may be), and which I am about to
assume.” 
FEDERAL OATHS OF OFFICE
President of the United States (U.S.
Constitutional Oath)
I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully exe-
cute the Office of President of the United States, and will
to the best of my ability, preserve, protect and defend
the Constitution of the United States.
Federal Employees
Title 5, Part III, Subpart B, Chapter 33,
Subchapter II, § 3331. Oath Of Office
An individual, except the President, elected or
appointed to an office of honor or profit in the civil ser-
vice or uniformed services, shall take the following oath: 
I, AB, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support
and defend the Constitution of the United States against
all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true
faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation
freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of eva-
sion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the
duties of the office on which I am about to enter. So help
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Federal Military Oaths of Office
“I, __________, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I
will support and defend the Constitution of the United
States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I
will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; and that I
will obey the orders of the President of the United States
and the orders of the officers appointed over me,
according to regulations and the Uniform Code of
Military Justice. So help me God.” (Title 10, US Code; Act
of 5 May 1960 replacing the wording first adopted in
1789, with amendment effective 5 October 1962).
I, __________ (SSAN), having been appointed an offi-
cer in the Army of the United States, as indicated above
in the grade of __________ do solemnly swear (or
affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of
the United States against all enemies, foreign or domes-
tic, that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same;
that I take this obligation freely, without any mental
reservations or purpose of evasion; and that I will well
and faithfully discharge the duties of the office upon
which I am about to enter; So help me God. (DA Form
71, 1 August 1959, for officers.)
National Banking Laws: Comptroller of the
Currency Requirement
12 USC 73
Each director, when appointed or elected, shall take
an oath that he will, so far as the duty devolves on him,
diligently and honestly administer the affairs of such
association, and will not knowingly violate or willingly
permit to be violated any of the provisions of title 62 of
the Revised Statutes, and that he is the owner in good
faith, and in his own right, of the number of shares of
stock required by title 62 of the Revised Statutes, sub-
scribed by him, or standing in his name on the books of
the association, and that the same is not hypothecated,
or in any way pledged, as  security for any loan or debt.
The oath shall be taken before a notary public, properly
authorized and commissioned by the State in which he
resides, or before any other officer having an official  seal
and authorized by the State to administer oaths, except
that the oath shall not be taken before any such notary
public or other officer who is an officer of the director’s
bank. The oath, subscribed by the director making it,
and certified by the notary  public or other officer before
whom it is taken, shall be immediately transmitted to the
Comptroller of the Currency and shall be filed and pre-
served in his office for a period of ten years. 